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An integrative social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) is developed that incorporates 3
socio-psychological perspectives on collective action. Three meta-analyses synthesized a total of 182
effects of perceived injustice, efficacy, and identity on collective action (corresponding to these socio-
psychological perspectives). Results showed that, in isolation, all 3 predictors had medium-sized (and
causal) effects. Moreover, results showed the importance of social identity in predicting collective action
by supporting SIMCA’s key predictions that (a) affective injustice and politicized identity produced
stronger effects than those of non-affective injustice and non-politicized identity; (b) identity predicted
collective action against both incidental and structural disadvantages, whereas injustice and efficacy
predicted collective action against incidental disadvantages better than against structural disadvantages;
(c) all 3 predictors had unique medium-sized effects on collective action when controlling for between-
predictor covariance; and (d) identity bridged the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective action.
Results also showed more support for SIMCA than for alternative models reflecting previous attempts at
theoretical integration. The authors discuss key implications for theory, practice, future research, and
further integration of social and psychological perspectives on collective action.
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What is it that mobilizes people to participate in social protest?
This has been a key question in social science from the foundation
of its various disciplines, and numerous explanations have been
explored. Research has examined social movements, social groups,
and experimental groups, embedded in different social contexts,
and studied with different methods and measures. Although qual-
itative reviews of this literature are abundant (e.g., Kelly &
Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 1997, 2004; Marx & Wood,
1975; McPhail, 1971; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a), there is at present
no quantitative research synthesis of the literature that focuses on
multiple predictors of collective action and their interrelations.
This is unfortunate for several reasons.
First, although the literature on this topic is large and multifac-
eted there is substantial scope for theoretical integration (e.g.,
Klandermans, 1997, 2004). Indeed, given recent calls for greater
integration in this domain, a quantitative synthesis that evaluates
and integrates these theoretical advances would seem both timely
and valuable. Second, a quantitative research synthesis of psycho-
logical predictors of collective action is of interest to disciplines
including psychology, sociology, political science, and economics.
In such a multidisciplinary arena, a key challenge is to bridge
subjective (psychological) and social (structural) perspectives on
when, why, and how people engage in social protest. This chal-
lenge is underlined by several recent efforts in the literature to
advance our understanding of the interaction between the two (e.g.,
Klandermans, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This is not just
a theoretical concern—a greater understanding of the interplay
between individual and social conditions that foster mobilization
has important practical consequences as well.
However, in order to successfully meet this challenge we
need an integrative psychological perspective that specifies the
key subjective predictors of collective action as well as their
interrelationships. The main aim of this quantitative research
synthesis is therefore to integrate three socio-psychological
perspectives on collective action that focus on subjective injus-
tice, identity, and efficacy as key predictors of collective action.
We first review each of these perspectives on collective action,
and then propose an integrative social identity model of collec-
tive action (SIMCA) that— unlike previous attempts at theoret-
ical integration—accounts for the relationships between the
three predictors as well as their predictive effects on collective
action. Second, we meta-analytically examine (a) the viability
of the three perspectives in isolation, (b) the viability of a
number of moderator variables suggested in the literature, and
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(c) the evaluation of, and comparisons between, SIMCA and
models based on previous attempts at theoretical integration.
Three Theoretical Perspectives on Collective Action
Collective action has been of long-standing interest to many
different disciplines, including sociology, political science, eco-
nomics, history, and psychology (e.g., Blumer, 1939; Davies,
1962; Davis, 1959; Gurr, 1968, 1970; McAdam, 1982; M. Olson,
1968; Smelser, 1962; Tarrow, 1998; R. H. Turner & Kilian, 1972).
The starting point of many approaches to collective action is the
assumption that it is a response to an objective state of disadvan-
tage. This implies that one can identify specific material conditions
as ulterior “causes” of collective strife (e.g., Hovland & Sears,
1940).
Although objective conditions are undoubtedly important, large-
scale systematic historical analyses demonstrate that their empir-
ical relation to collective action, popular disturbance, and mass
violence is elusive and weak at best (e.g., Green, Glaser, & Rich,
1998; Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975). Perhaps as a result, over the past
3 decades or so the literature has increasingly concerned itself with
the more proximal socio-psychological determinants of collective
action (Klandermans, 1997). The starting assumption of these
approaches is that people respond to a subjective sense of disad-
vantage, which can (to some extent) appear to deviate from, and
hence not necessarily flow from, the “objective” physical condi-
tions (e.g., Major, 1994; Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, & Young,
1999). Indeed, many current theories and studies of collective
action make little or no attempt to consider the objective material
conditions and focus almost exclusively on the social and psycho-
logical dimension of protest. It is these theories and their tests that
are central to this research synthesis.
The three subjective variables that could affect collective action
that have received most scholarly attention are perceived injustice,
perceived efficacy, and a sense of social identity1 (Gamson, 1992;
Klandermans, 1997, 2004). Each of these constructs stems from its
own distinct theoretical tradition, and these schools of thought
have sometimes been portrayed as providing conflicting explana-
tions for collective action (e.g., Finkel & Rule, 1987; Gurney &
Tierney, 1982; Walker & Smith, 2002). More recently, however,
some attempts at theoretical integration have been made (e.g.,
Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Klander-
mans, 1984, 1997, 2004; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke,
1999; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). Crucially, these different at-
tempts make different predictions, yet none of them considers all
the relationships between these three factors and their predictive
effects on collective action, and none therefore succeeds in being
truly integrative across the theoretical spectrum. To this end, we
propose SIMCA as a new and integrative perspective on collective
action, which proposes that social identity is central to collective
action because it directly motivates collective action and simulta-
neously bridges the injustice and efficacy explanations of collec-
tive action. Before outlining our model, however, we first discuss
the three dominant perspectives on collective action in isolation.
Explaining Collective Action Through Perceived Injustice
Following the traditional assumption that (objective) depriva-
tion propels collective action, the emphasis in research and theory
gradually shifted from studying the consequences of objective
inequality to studying the consequences of its subjective experi-
ence. This development was initiated by observations that objec-
tive deprivation alone did not predict collective action particularly
well. Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949)
introduced the concept of relative deprivation to explain why
objective deprivation does not always predict peoples’ dissatisfac-
tions with their lots. This research examined, among other things,
why military police who were given slow promotions were nev-
ertheless more satisfied than air corpsmen who were given rapid
promotions. Research such as this led to the development of
relative deprivation theory (RDT; e.g., Crosby, 1976, 1982;
Folger, 1986, 1987; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Pettigrew, 1967; Runci-
man, 1966; Stouffer et al., 1949; Walker & Smith, 2002), which
focused on the subjective experience of unjust disadvantage. Based
on ideas derived, among others, from social comparison theory
(Festinger, 1954), RDT proposes that feelings of deprivation de-
velop on the basis of social comparisons with specific others. In
line with this, Stouffer et al. (1949) concluded that the military
police did not compare themselves with air corpsmen and hence
did not feel deprived. According to RDT, it is only when social
comparisons result in a subjective sense of injustice that collective
action to redress the injustice is likely to occur.
The notion that the subjective experience of inequality carries
greater weight than its objective, material origins is echoed in more
recent developments in the social-psychological literature on fair-
ness judgments, which has explored how people respond to dis-
tributive and procedural fairness (Adams, 1965; Leventhal, 1980;
Lind & Tyler, 1988; Miller, 2000; Thibault & Walker, 1975; Tyler,
Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For
example, authorities’ use of fair procedures typically diminishes
individuals’ negative reactions to unfavorable outcomes (e.g.,
Folger, 1977). Moreover, theory and research have suggested that
social inequality in distributions can be perceived as fair (e.g., Jost
& Major, 2001; Major, 1994).
RDT developed in two important ways in the last decades. The
first development has been to clarify what social comparisons
foster collective action. H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) found meta-
analytic evidence for Runciman’s (1966) proposal that collective
action is likely when people experience fraternal, or group-based,
deprivation (see also Cook, Crosby, & Hennigan, 1977; Dion,
1986; Dube´-Simard & Guimond, 1986; Guimond & Dube´-Simard,
1983). There is a conceptual “fit” between the intergroup compar-
isons on which group-based deprivation is based and the inter-
group nature of collective action (Postmes et al., 1999). Indeed,
egoistic deprivation (also referred to as individual-based depriva-
tion, and based on interpersonal comparisons) is less likely to
1 We refer to identity as an explanation of collective action in terms of
peoples’ subjective sense of identification with a group. We chose the term
identity (and not identification) to be in sync with the terms injustice and
efficacy as explanations of collective action. Whereas identification refers
to the subjective affiliation with the group, social identity refers to the
socially shared understandings of what it means to be a group member, and
this typically includes stereotypes of in- and out-groups in relation to each
other as well as appreciations of the relative status of those groups. The
core distinction is therefore that identification reflects the individuals’
relationship to the group, whereas social identity reflects what is consen-
sually held to be the social reality of the group (Postmes & Jetten, 2006).
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result in collective action and even has clear negative effects on the
individual’s well-being (Koomen & Fra¨nkel, 1992; Walker &
Mann, 1987; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).
The second important development in RDT was to explore
what made deprivation such a powerful motivator. In particu-
lar, researchers have examined whether cognitive or affective
components of group-based deprivation affected collective ac-
tion (e.g., Guimond & Dube´-Simard, 1983; Tyler & Smith,
1998). Originally, RDT proposed that collective actions are
propelled by profound feelings of injustice. However, empirical
work in the 1980s and 1990s began to focus more on peoples’
perceptions or cognitive interpretations of inequality. Despite
obvious connections, the two are nonetheless fundamentally
different—the cold knowledge of being less well off than some-
one else may sometimes elicit feelings of injustice, but at other
times such inequality may not be questioned, or even perceived
as just and legitimate. In a meta-analytic test of the traditional
assumptions of RDT, H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) found that
whereas perceptions of group-based deprivation predicted col-
lective action, feelings of deprivation were a more powerful
predictor.
This finding resonates with recent theorizing in the area of
intergroup or group-based emotions (Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R.
Smith, 1993), which, in line with appraisal theories of emotion
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Roseman, 2001; Scherer,
1984, 2001; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; for an overview, see
Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), proposes that group-based
emotions such as anger form a conceptual bridge between group-
based appraisal and specific action tendencies (e.g., Mackie &
Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, &
Leach, 2004; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). In
contrast to the classic view on emotion in collective action (as
individual and dysfunctional responses; e.g., Le Bon, 1895/1995;
Oberschall, 1973), this contemporary view of group-based emo-
tions assumes that they are functional responses to situations or
events that are relevant to one’s group. More specific to collective
action, when group-based inequality or deprivation is perceived as
unjust, group-based emotions like anger should motivate collective
action because they invoke specific action tendencies to confront
those responsible in order to redress their unfair deprivation. In
other words, such feelings of group-based anger are states of action
readiness (Frijda, 1986).
The current research synthesis therefore examines (a) whether
peoples’ subjective experience of injustice in terms of group-based
inequality or deprivation predicts collective action and (b) whether
the affective experience of injustice produces stronger effect sizes
than those of the non-affective (cognitive) perception of injustice.
Moreover, the synthesis addresses the issue of causality in this
relationship. As such, we go beyond H. J. Smith and Ortiz’s (2002)
meta-analysis of RDT that pertained to relative deprivation but not
to more general perceptions and experiences of injustice. More-
over, the purpose of this research synthesis is not just to test
predictions about peoples’ experiences of injustice derived from
RDT but, more generally, to integrate this perspective with two
other major perspectives on collective action, based in efficacy and
identity concerns, to form a more comprehensive and complete
account of collective action.
Explaining Collective Action Through Perceived Efficacy
RDT came under attack in the seventies by scholars arguing that
a subjective sense of injustice is not sufficient for collective action
to occur (Finkel & Rule, 1987; Gurney & Tierney, 1982; McPhail,
1971; for reviews, see Ferree & Miller, 1985; Klandermans, 1989;
Walker & Smith, 2002). Building on the argument that social
inequality and discrimination exist in almost all societies and are
therefore too pervasive and general to predict collective action,
resource mobilization theorists proposed that the mobilization of
resources by quasi-political organizations is key to moving people
to action (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977; see also Gamson, 1975;
Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). Resource mobilization theory as-
sumes that social protest constitutes a set of rational collective
actions by groups to advance their goals and interests, pressurizing
those in power to submit to the demands of the disadvantaged. In
this perspective, collective action is a strategic and political enter-
prise rather than a passionate response to felt injustices.
Research on resource mobilization focused accordingly on the
formation and organization of political institutions, in particular of
social movement organizations (SMOs). This focus on objective,
structural factors carried with it an assumption, sometimes im-
plicit, that collective action was based on decisions made by
rational individual actors. In this line of thought, individual deci-
sions to engage in collective action are based on choices to
minimize personal losses and maximize personal gains (M. Olson,
1968). Ironically, despite this emphasis on the individual and his or
her decisions, the concern with rather abstract and instrumental
decision-making processes meant that research attention drifted
away from the consideration of individuals and their subjective
motives for collective action. Instead, resource mobilization re-
search focused largely on more objective social-structural vari-
ables that were hypothesized to serve as anchors or inputs for those
decisions.
Klandermans’s (1984) integration of elements of sociological
and social-psychological theories of collective action marked a
return to combining a consideration of subjective and socio-
structural predictors of collective action. Based on M. Olson’s
(1968) theory of collective action and theories of the attitude–
behavior link (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975, Klandermans (1984) proposed that individual mo-
tives for collective action could be measured by subjective value-
expectancy products. The expectancy component was a particu-
larly important element as it contained peoples’ subjective
expectation of whether collective action would be effective in
achieving its goal(s). Klandermans’s (1984) contribution, although
criticized for being too individualistic (Schrager, 1985), succeeded
in bringing back the subjective element in instrumental explana-
tions of collective action.2
In line with this reorientation, efficacy has become one of the
key instrumental explanations of collective action—the idea being
that people engage in collective action if people believe this will
make it more likely that relevant goals are achieved. Consistent
2 Theoretically, individual cost-benefit calculation motives should pre-
dict collective action independent of social identity motives (e.g., Simon et
al., 1998; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). We therefore expect the former to—if
anything—increase the explained variance in collective action independent
of the SIMCA variables.
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with one of the developments in RDT, more recent thinking about
efficacy has begun to explore the group as a basis of the efficacy
construct. Mummendey et al. (1999) proposed that group efficacy
is the more proximal predictor of collective action, defined as the
shared belief that one’s group can resolve its grievances through
unified effort (see also Bandura, 1995, 1997; Folger, 1986, 1987).
Their analysis of group efficacy echoes certain properties of the
classic sociological construct of agency, which similarly refers to
beliefs that individual actions have the potential to shape, and thus
change, the social structure (e.g., Gergen, 1999). In other words,
group efficacy gives people a sense of collective power or strength
on the basis of which they believe themselves capable of trans-
forming the situation and destiny of their group (Drury & Reicher,
2005; Reicher, 1996, 2001). This means that the stronger the
subjective sense of the group’s efficacy, the more likely people are
to engage in collective action (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly &
Breinlinger, 1996; Mummendey et al., 1999).
In line with these accumulated ideas about efficacy, the current
research synthesis examines whether there is an empirical basis for
the proposition that the subjective experience of group efficacy
facilitates collective action. Moreover, the synthesis addresses the
issue of causality in this relationship. However, the main purpose
of this research synthesis is to reconcile the efficacy perspective
with the injustice perspective by using the concept of social
identity as a conceptual bridge between the two.
Explaining Collective Action Through Social Identity
In the seventies, a new social-psychological perspective on
collective action emerged in the form of social identity theory
(SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT proposes that
people generally strive for and benefit from positive social iden-
tities associated with their membership groups. This raises the
question of why people would identify with groups that reflect
negatively on them (e.g., disadvantaged or low status groups).
SIT’s answer is that three socio-structural variables affect how
people manage their identity concerns: The permeability of group
boundaries, the legitimacy of intergroup relations, and their sta-
bility. Permeable group boundaries allow disadvantaged group
members to leave their group for a higher status group, whereas
impermeable group boundaries offer no such “exit” (see also
Hirschmann, 1970). If exit is impossible, people have to make the
most of their situations. They can do so in multiple ways—and one
of them is to engage in social competition, of which collective
action is the clearest expression.
According to SIT, when members of a lower status group
perceive the intergroup status differential to be illegitimate and
unstable, they are more likely to identify with their group and
engage in collective action to change the intergroup status differ-
ential (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978).
Thus, people need to perceive that there are cognitive alternatives
to the status quo before social identification with their group leads
them to mobilize them for collective action. Therefore SIT predicts
that identification with the disadvantaged group is the proximal
predictor of collective action (Ellemers, 1993; Kelly & Brein-
linger, 1996; Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1978).3 Note here
that the illegitimacy and instability of intergroup status differences
are not necessarily identical to perceptions of group-based injus-
tice and efficacy. Whereas the former refer to the more distal
socio-structural factors that SIT predicts will influence social iden-
tities, the latter two refer to more proximal psychological expla-
nations of collective action (see also Mummendey et al., 1999).
Reicher and colleagues in particular have applied these ideas to
collective action (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005;
Reicher, 1996, 2001), in their argument that social identity serves
to mobilize people for social change. Simon, Stu¨rmer, and col-
leagues (e.g., Simon et al., 1998; for a review, see Stu¨rmer &
Simon, 2004a) took this argument one step further in the context
of SMOs by proposing that identification with an SMO is even
more predictive of collective action than is identification with the
disadvantaged group because the former is a politicized identity.
As Simon and Klandermans (2001) defined the concept, people
“evince politicized collective identity to the extent that they en-
gage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on
behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive societal
context in which this struggle has to be fought out” (p. 319). In
other words, people can develop more specific “activist” identities
through engaging in collective action. Not unlike the political
focus of resource mobilization theory, politicized identity focuses
on the political struggle for power with the authorities in the public
domain (see also Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996), which allows the
political to become a (personal) identity project (see Klein, Spears,
& Reicher, 2007) that transforms individuals’ identity from one
defined by social circumstance into a more agentic one (Drury &
Reicher, 1999). Politicized identity more specifically connects
people to the structural plight of the disadvantaged group, resulting
in an “inner obligation” to participate in social movement activities
(Stu¨rmer, 2000; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a).
In sum, the current research synthesis examines whether social
identity predicts collective action. Moreover, the synthesis ad-
dresses the issue of causality in this relationship. We also take into
account the nature of that identity in order to investigate whether
politicized identities are more strongly bound up with collective
action than are non-politicized identities.
Aims of the Quantitative Research Synthesis
The overarching purpose of the research synthesis is to ascertain
the magnitude and stability of the effect of each of the three
predictors of collective action identified above. Within, we focus
on three key issues. First, we examine whether there is evidence
for the causal assumption that injustice, efficacy, and identity
predict collective action. Second, we examine evidence for mod-
erator variables of the effect sizes (e.g., affective injustice should
produce stronger effects than does non-affective injustice, and
politicized identity should produce stronger effects than does non-
politicized identity). Third, the viability of SIMCA and alternative
3 This relationship between group identification and collective action is
only predicted to exist under the conditions of relative impermeability,
illegitimacy, and instability (Tajfel, 1978) because these are the conditions
when collective action becomes viable as an identity management strategy.
Because those conditions were met in virtually all the studies included in
this meta-analysis, we could not test this aspect of the predictions made by
SIT (but see Ellemers, 1993; Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001).
However, it did allow us to test the predictions of SIT regarding the effects
of social identification more effectively.
507PREDICTING COLLECTIVE ACTION
models based on previous attempts at theoretical integration are
tested, compared, and evaluated.
The Issue of Causality
Most primary studies on collective action have employed cor-
relational designs. For example, a typical study on collective
action would have participants answer a questionnaire pertaining
to collective action and the predictor(s) of interest (e.g., Walker &
Mann, 1987). Another common way of conducting research is to
gather cross-sectional survey data among members of a social
movement (e.g., Stu¨rmer, 2000). Correlational designs of this kind,
however, do not allow causal inferences, and hence this research is
unable to demonstrate that injustice, identity, or efficacy variables
predict collective action. However, studies that, for example, sys-
tematically vary (i.e., manipulate) injustice, identity, or efficacy
variables and measure collective action enable a test of the viabil-
ity of the assumed causal direction.
Few studies, however, have experimentally manipulated injus-
tice, identity, and efficacy. Although injustice variables are per-
haps more easily manipulated (e.g., Grant & Brown, 1995;
Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990),
efficacy (e.g., Van Zomeren, 2006, Study 1), and particularly
identity variables (e.g., Simon et al., 1998, Study 2) are harder to
manipulate. One reason for this is that social identification with a
particular group is often already too established to manipulate
successfully. Therefore, some have used the salience of a partic-
ular social identity as a proxy for manipulating social identification
with the group (e.g., Simon et al., 1998, Study 2). Thus, although
the majority of the research on collective action does not allow
causal inferences, a subset of studies enabled us to examine
whether there is support for the often-assumed causal direction,
flowing from injustice, efficacy, and identity to collective action.
Two points are relevant to this issue. First, some scholars have
argued that the reverse causal sequence (collective action predict-
ing injustice, efficacy, or identity) is equally likely to be found as
the often-assumed sequence (e.g., Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodri-
guez, & De Weerd, 2002; Reicher, 1996). If this assertion is
correct, then it follows that the magnitude of effects in cross-
sectional studies should be very similar to effect sizes in research
that does allow for causal inferences. That is, even if reverse
causality is in some cases a significant occurrence, the magnitude
of these reverse effects is not such that they would entirely inval-
idate causal inferences drawn from the observations of cross-
sectional data. In contrast, if reverse causal effects are stronger,
this should be reflected in stronger effect sizes in cross-sectional
studies. Second, a more practical use of manipulations of variables
like injustice, efficacy, and identity is that they can facilitate or
impede real-world collective action. Indeed, according to Gamson
(1992), people are mobilized through a so-called “collective action
frame,” consisting of the three variables under study here (injus-
tice, identity, and efficacy). Thus, the causality question is not only
a theoretical or statistical issue—it is also very much tied to issues
of practical application and intervention.
Moderator Variables
By defining appropriate moderator variables, meta-analyses can
test which variables produce systematic and psychologically
meaningful variation in effect sizes and explain any heterogeneity
of effects. After examining whether the three predictors predict
collective action in isolation, and whether the issue of causality can
be resolved, we examine moderator variables of the predicted
isolated effects of injustice, identity, and efficacy on collective
action. The choice of moderator variables was informed by four
theoretically relevant questions that are current and recurrent is-
sues in this literature.
Type of Injustice
An important theoretical question is whether feelings of injus-
tice (affective injustice) predict collective action better than injus-
tice based on perceptions and cognitions alone (non-affective in-
justice). As noted, H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) showed that
feelings of relative deprivation were more strongly related to
collective behavior than were perceptions of relative deprivation.
Theoretically, the role of (group-based) emotions in collective
action relates to both the injustice and identity explanations of
collective action, together with attempts at theoretical integration
between the two (Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Kelly & Breinlinger,
1996; Mummendey et al., 1999; H. J. Smith & Spears, 1996).
Indeed, intergroup emotion theory (Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R.
Smith, 1993) suggests that group-based appraisals or interpreta-
tions of an intergroup event (e.g., injustice) determine specific
group-based emotions (e.g., anger or resentment) that, in turn,
predict specific action tendencies (e.g., wanting to confront those
responsible; see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Van Zomeren et
al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Moreover, both notions of group-
based deprivation and group-based emotion are theoretically based
in social identity. Specifically, when people identify with their
group, or social identity is otherwise salient, they are more likely
to make intergroup comparisons and hence perceive and emotion-
ally experience injustice on the basis of their social identity. Thus,
we examine whether, within our sample of effect sizes between
injustice and collective action, affective injustice produces stron-
ger effect sizes than non-affective injustice.
Type of Identity
Another important theoretical question is whether politicized
identity results in stronger effect sizes than non-politicized identity
(see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a).
Indeed, politicized identity (i.e., identification with an SMO) has
been found relatively more important in predicting collective ac-
tion than non-politicized identity (i.e., identification with the dis-
advantaged group in general; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et
al., 1998; for an overview, see Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). For
example, although one’s identity as a woman should be reasonably
predictive of willingness to undertake collective action on behalf
of women, identification with the feminist movement should be an
even better predictor (see also Hercus, 1999). Similarly, identifi-
cation with gay men in general should predict collective action to
a lesser extent than does identification with the gay movement
(e.g., Simon et al., 1998). This is consistent with the idea that
politicized identity goes hand in hand with a stronger internal
obligation to participate in social movement activities (Stu¨rmer &
Simon, 2004a).
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This differentiation between two types of identity relates con-
ceptually to the importance of identity development and transfor-
mation (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher, 1996, 2001; Simon &
Klandermans, 2001). It confirms, indirectly, that the politicization
of social identity allows the political to become a personal identity
project (see Klein et al., 2007), transforming individuals’ identity
from one that is defined by social circumstance into a more agentic
one (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Therefore, we examine whether,
within our identity sample, the effects of politicized identity on
collective action are stronger than those of non-politicized identity.
Type of Disadvantage
In the literature, there is considerable variability in the type of
disadvantage that collective action seeks to redress. Group mem-
bers protest to reduce structural disadvantages in society (e.g.,
discrimination against homosexuals, women, ethnic minorities)
but also to repair incidental disadvantages (e.g., a newly imposed
tax, a raise in tuition fees for students, the building of a plant in
one’s neighborhood, or a windfarm in one’s “backyard”). Struc-
tural disadvantage includes structural low group status or discrim-
ination based on membership of a social group or category (e.g.,
Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Major, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999;
Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004; Tajfel, 1978). In
contrast, incidental disadvantage revolves around issue-based or
situation-based disadvantages (e.g., “suddenly imposed griev-
ances”; Walsh, 1988; see also Klandermans, 1997).
We propose that the key difference between incidental and
structural disadvantage is that in response to incidental disadvan-
tage people need to develop a shared social identity that revolves
around their common fate (i.e., the situation or issue), whereas in
the case of structural disadvantage such an identity is usually a
historical or socio-structural given. Put differently, for incidental
disadvantage a sense of social identity needs to be formed (i.e., the
group’s social identity emerges on the basis of certain objectives),
whereas for structural disadvantage social identity is already es-
tablished by the structural disadvantage and hence needs to be
transformed (i.e., the group’s social identity needs to be changed
from something established toward “becoming” something else).
This basic difference has at least three important implications.4
First, this difference affects the relationship between injustice
and collective action. Unlike incidental disadvantage, structural
disadvantage can be psychologically harmful to the self (Major,
1994; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002) because structural disadvan-
tage is bound to be more defining in terms of self-evaluation than
is incidental disadvantage. As elaborated by SIT, people have a
number of strategies available, other than collective action, which
may help them cope with such psychological harm. These strate-
gies are particularly likely to be used in contexts in which people
do not consider alternatives to the status quo (e.g., when structural
intergroup status differences are stable and legitimate). For exam-
ple, people may accept or even internalize their disadvantage, or
use social creativity strategies (e.g., Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers,
2006; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Major, 1994; Schmitt, Branscombe,
& Postmes, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). As a result, the sense
of injustice associated with structural disadvantages should less
easily result in collective action than is the case for incidental
disadvantages.
Another reason why perceived injustice is likely to play a more
important role in collective action to redress incidental disadvan-
tages is that the appraised injustice associated with incidental
disadvantages is, by definition, a response to a more novel situa-
tion. Given that group-based emotions are theorized to be func-
tional responses to subjectively appraised situations, the potential
for injustice-based emotions like anger to arise and affect collec-
tive action is stronger for incidental than for structural disadvan-
tages. Indeed, to the extent that structural disadvantages reflect
large, stable, and systemic effects, this will affect how situations
are embedded and appraised (e.g., system justification; Jost &
Hunyady, 2002; Jost & Major, 2001). This makes it less likely that
the injustice of structural disadvantages arouses similar action-
oriented group-based emotions like anger. This line of thought
again implies that the relationship between the experience of
injustice and collective action should be weaker for structural
disadvantage than for incidental disadvantage.
The structural–incidental distinction also has a key implication
for the relationship between efficacy and collective action. That is,
structural disadvantage is harder to change than incidental disad-
vantage for at least two reasons. First, identity transformation for
the structurally disadvantaged is bound to encounter more resis-
tance than is identity formation for the incidentally disadvantaged,
because structurally disadvantaged groups are engaged in a strug-
gle with a more powerful (or high status) out-group that typically
resists efforts for social change. Indeed, high status groups are
often motivated to maintain and enhance group-based hierarchies
(e.g., Jost & Major, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al.,
2004). Second, the means or resources available for combating
structural disadvantage are typically fewer than for combating
incidental disadvantage (Klandermans, 1997). For both of these
reasons, the relationship between efficacy and collective action
should be weaker for structural disadvantage than for incidental
disadvantage.
Yet, we suggest that a third key implication of the structural–
incidental disadvantage distinction is that social identity should be
a crucial predictor of collective action to redress both incidental
disadvantage and structural disadvantage. For structural disadvan-
tage, social identity connects individuals to the existing social
structure, and it predicts collective action as a strategy to deal with
a threat to the (social) self when there is an illegitimate and
unstable intergroup status differential (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel,
1978; Turner & Brown, 1978). In addition, SMOs play an impor-
tant role in redressing structural disadvantages because they allow
people to identify with an organization more specifically consti-
tuted to contest this structure and challenge the status quo (which
relates to the politicization of identity; Simon & Klandermans,
2001; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). However, we suggest that social
identity is also important to collective action against incidental
disadvantages where SMOs are unlikely to pre-exist. Specifically,
individuals can form a social identity in response to a particular
situation or event (e.g., feelings of being unfairly treated by the
government). When people come to realize that they belong to this
newly formed group, their group-based perceptions (J. C. Turner,
4 This variable can be conceptualized as both a continuous variable (i.e.,
interval) and a categorical variable. In fact, in the analyses to come we
coded for this variable in both ways.
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Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and group-based emo-
tions and action tendencies (e.g., Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R.
Smith, 1993; Yzerbyt et al., 2003) are an integral part of this newly
formed social identity. Thus, identity should predict collective
action against both structural and incidental disadvantage.
Type of Measurement of Collective Action
Researchers often must rely on proximate measures of collective
action. It is hard to quantify collective action, and therefore re-
searchers often resort to controlled and somewhat artificial re-
sponse environments (survey methodologies or lab settings, see
also Postmes & Spears, 1998). In such studies, researchers gener-
ally rely on proxies for collective action such as attitudes toward
collective action (e.g., being supportive of collective action) and
intentions or action tendencies to engage in collective action (e.g.,
willingness to engage in collective action; “I would engage in
collective action”), rather than self-reports of past behavior (e.g.,
number of petitions signed last year), or, even better, actual be-
havioral measures (e.g., signing a petition now). Moreover, when
researchers do use a combination of these measures they some-
times collapse them into one scale, obscuring the similarities
and/or differences between attitudinal, intentional, and behavioral
measures.
One exception is a study by De Weerd and Klandermans (1999)
in which intentions to participate in demonstrations and blockades
among Dutch farmers were found to be good predictors of their
actual participation 2 years later (see also Fox & Schofield, 1989;
Klandermans et al., 2002). This finding resonates with classic
attitude–behavior models in psychology (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) that suggest that although attitudes
and behavior are related to each other, this relationship is mediated
by intentions. Indeed, whereas attitudes can be relatively idealistic,
intentions tend to take more account of practical limitations and
opportunities. However, compared with intentions, behavior is
subject to interference from additional random or systematic fac-
tors (e.g., Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Hence, effect sizes be-
tween predictors and collective action are likely to become weaker
the more directly measures tap actual behavior, and more generally
behavioral measures should produce weaker effect sizes than do
non-behavioral measures. However, it is also important to show
that the three predictors still affect behavioral measures of collec-
tive action. Therefore, all three meta-analyses examine whether
effect sizes decrease the more indices of collective action tap
actual behavior, whether behavioral measures produce weaker
effect sizes than non-behavioral measures, and whether behavioral
measures still result in sizeable effects.
Toward Further Theoretical Integration: SIMCA
The current research synthesis proposes an integrative psycho-
logical perspective on collective action that, while grounded in the
various insights from social-identity-based approaches, is new in
key respects. Specifically, the relative prominence of social iden-
tity in our line of thought fits with our review of the literature and
our predictions that social identity (a) underlies group-based emo-
tions that bridge the gap between the perception of injustice and
collective action, (b) can politicize and hence motivate collective
action by channeling broad social identities into more specific
protest organizations, and (c) should be predictive of both more
structural and more incidental types of collective disadvantage
(unlike the injustice and efficacy explanations, which are predicted
to be more important to incidental disadvantages). The research
synthesis therefore examines the size of the relationships between
identity and injustice, identity and efficacy, and injustice and
efficacy, and it examines how these variables uniquely predict
collective action in conjunction. Below we first describe different
lines of integrative thought that have emerged in the literature over
the past 2 decades or so. Note that we aim to make the distinctions
between these general lines of thought explicit because this will
help theorists and researchers to be more explicit in their concep-
tualization in future work on collective action. We subsequently
present SIMCA as a new psychological perspective on collective
action.
Three Types of Disagreement Between Existing
Integrative Models
Previous attempts at theoretical integration suggest at least three
types of disagreement between different models. First, models
differ about the usefulness of all three predictors. For example,
some models do not explicitly include efficacy as a predictor of
collective action. Kawakami and Dion (1995) were among the first
to attempt an integration of relative deprivation and social identity
explanations for collective action. Based on self-categorization
theory principles (J. C. Turner et al., 1987), they proposed that a
salient social identity (rather than personal identity) would lead
people to make intergroup comparisons (rather than interpersonal
comparisons) resulting in group-based deprivation (rather than
individual-based deprivation). Social identity (salience) thus de-
termines the extent to which injustice is perceived and felt (H. J.
Smith & Spears, 1996; H. J. Smith, Spears, & Oyen, 1994). This
suggests that the identity and injustice explanations of collective
action should covary (which is echoed in Mummendey et al.’s,
1999, and Van Zomeren et al.’s, 2004, models described later).
Moreover, this suggests that identity affects collective action
through perceived injustice, which implies that the effect of iden-
tity should be reduced when injustice is taken into account.
Other models do not explicitly expect injustice to predict col-
lective action (e.g., Simon et al., 1998). This line of thought,
associated with the dual pathway model of social movement par-
ticipation developed by Simon, Stu¨rmer, and colleagues (Simon et
al., 1998; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a), suggests that injustice is often
a constant rather than a variable (e.g., when members of a social
movement all experience a sense of injustice), and therefore in-
justice is unlikely to be able to predict collective action. The model
predicts that (politicized) identity and instrumental cost-benefit
motivations (including efficacy) for collective action operate rel-
atively independently of each other. Theoretically, these two mo-
tives for collective action operate at different levels (i.e., the
individual and group levels), which implies little covariance be-
tween the identity and efficacy explanations of collective action.
Thus, different models disagree about the usefulness of all three
predictors.
A second type of disagreement between models refers to those
models that explicitly include all three predictors but disagree
about their specific interrelationships. Although most models agree
on the positive link between identity and injustice (e.g., Kawakami
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& Dion, 1995; Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et al.,
2004), there is little consensus on the link between identity and
efficacy (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; Simon et al., 1998) and
between injustice and efficacy (e.g., Folger, 1987; Mackie et al.,
2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).
Indeed, in contrast to Simon et al.’s (1998) model, Mummendey
et al. (1999) predicted that the identity and efficacy explanations
covary. This model predicts that group identification enhances
group efficacy beliefs, which in turn predict collective action.
Thus, Mummendey et al.’s (1999) model implies that the direct
effect of identification on collective action should be reduced
when efficacy is taken into account. This fits with the line of
thought developed by Reicher and colleagues (e.g., Reicher, 1984,
1996, 2001; see also Cocking & Drury, 2004; Drury & Reicher,
1999, 2000, 2005), who have suggested that social identity refers
to the process through which people construe (or negotiate) their
understandings of the self and the social world. On the basis of
these understandings, people do not just form ideas of who they
are, they also form ideas of what they can (or want to) become.
Identity is therefore not just about “being”—it is also about “be-
coming” (see also Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). Identification
with the group should thus be understood as a strategy—an attempt
by group members to empower themselves and their in-group in
order to realize their collective ideals, and to strive for social
change (Drury & Reicher, 2005).
There are even larger differences among perspectives on the
relation between injustice and efficacy as predictors of collective
action. There are at least three different hypotheses. First, relative
deprivation theorists like Folger (1986, 1987) have argued that
although stronger efficacy may result in stronger feelings of rela-
tive deprivation, too much faith in collective goal achievement
decreases a focus on such feelings of injustice because people
believe that social change will follow either with or without their
participation (see also Ellemers, 2002). This argument implies a
negative association between injustice and efficacy. Second, inter-
group emotion theorists have argued, in contrast, that stronger
group efficacy beliefs allow people to experience their sense of
injustice more strongly because they have more power to redress
this injustice (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). This argument
implies a positive association between the injustice and efficacy
variables. Finally, Mummendey et al.’s (1999) and Van Zomeren
et al.’s (2004) models predict that injustice and efficacy are rela-
tively independent explanations of collective action, which implies
little covariance between the injustice and efficacy variables.
The final type of disagreement between models refers to whether
all three factors uniquely predict collective action. For example,
Mummendey et al.’s (1999) model predicts that identity should no
longer uniquely predict collective action once injustice and efficacy
are taken into account (see also Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Van
Zomeren et al., 2004). Simon et al. ’s (1998) model, on the other hand,
predicts that identity uniquely predicts collective action. Given these
mixed predictions in the literature, we propose SIMCA as a new
integrative psychological perspective on collective action.
SIMCA as a New Psychological Perspective on Collective
Action
According to SIT, social identity is a key predictor of collective
action because it explains and predicts intergroup behavior. How-
ever, in recent research on social identity in the self-categorization
tradition, the emphasis has shifted more broadly to the way in
which social identities function as systems of shared social mean-
ing (Swaab, Postmes, Van Beest, & Spears, 2007; Turner, 1991).
That is, social identity allows for group-based perceptions and
emotions that are shared with fellow group members. Thus, social
identities should have a direct influence on collective action but
also influence the way in which group members appraise and feel
about a particular situation or social structure (e.g., perceptions or
feelings of injustice and efficacy). Indeed, social identities are
formed, mobilized, or transformed inter alia to gear group mem-
bers up for action. It follows that social identity should not have
just a direct impact on collective action but also an indirect effect
through informing group-based perceptions or feelings of injustice
and group efficacy.
Specifically, SIMCA proposes that social identity predicts col-
lective action directly as well as indirectly through the injustice
and efficacy variables. Social identity underlies injustice because it
provides the basis for the group-based experience of injustice.
Hence, it can positively buffer group members against the negative
consequences of low group status (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, &
Harvey, 1999; Postmes & Branscombe, 2002) and emotionally
gear them up for collective action (E. R. Smith, 1993; Van Zome-
ren et al., 2004). Moreover, social identity underlies efficacy
because a stronger sense of identity empowers relatively powerless
individuals (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005). In other words, social
identity affects group members’ experiences of both group-based
injustice and efficacy, which prefigures SIMCA’s prediction that
social identity functions as a conceptual bridge between the two.
Given these considerations, SIMCA proposes that identity, in-
justice, and efficacy all provide unique explanations of collective
action and that social identity bridges the injustice and efficacy
explanations of collective action in so far as it predicts perceptions
of both. Thus, social identity is not only a unique predictor of
collective action, but it also functions as the psychological con-
nection between injustice and efficacy. Because SIMCA predicts
that social identity forms a bridge between perceptions of injustice
and efficacy, the model thus predicts that the latter variables do not
share any other variance than the variance predicted by shared
identity.
SIMCA differs from previous integrative models (e.g.,
Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Mummendey et al., 1999; Simon et al.,
1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), because it is more inclusive,
parsimonious, and specific. It allows for a unique effect of identity,
for example, because it acknowledges the possibility that social
identities can politicize and hence have unique effects on collec-
tive action. Moreover, it allows for a unique effect of injustice
because it acknowledges the possibility that the distinct group-
based affective experience of injustice motivates collective action.
Finally, it predicts that social identity facilitates the subjective
experience of both injustice and efficacy. Thus, SIMCA marries
different approaches that make different specific predictions about
these relationships by integrating them into a coherent model with
a key role for social identity.
SIMCA also differs from broad, flexible models of collective
action (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001)
because of the specificity of its predictions. More general models
of collective action typically focus on the dynamic and flexible
process of mobilization (including, e.g., objective or macro-level
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variables) and typically attempt to transcend levels of analysis by
considering psychological processes in their political, social, and
historical context. This breadth and comprehensiveness, however,
can be a weakness when it comes to explicating the relationships
among various psychological factors involved. Although SIMCA
shares the assumption of those dynamic and flexible models that
the social and historical contexts are important factors in the
mobilization process (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; see also Klander-
mans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994; see also
Haslam, 2004), SIMCA focuses on the more specific predictions
concerning the three psychological predictors of collective action
and their interrelationships (that we assume to psychologically
mediate the influence of objective factors). Given the absence of
complete consensus in the literature, we believe that a test of these
specific predictions is a key step forward, not least for the future
development of broader and dynamic models of collective action.
Summary and Hypotheses
The present quantitative research synthesis examines the viabil-
ity of injustice, efficacy, and identity as explanations of collective
action in three separate meta-analyses. Furthermore, it examines
the issues of causality, moderator variables, and further theoretical
integration (in terms of the validity of SIMCA compared with
other integrative models of collective action). Taken together, we
propose SIMCA as an encompassing and integrative account of
collective action, predicting that (a) all three predictors (causally)
affect collective action; (b) affective injustice should produce
stronger effect sizes than those of non-affective injustice, and
politicized identity should produce stronger effect sizes than those
of non-politicized identity; (c) identity should predict both inci-
dental and structural disadvantage, whereas injustice and efficacy
should predict structural disadvantage less well than incidental
disadvantage; (d) all three predictors should have unique effects
when controlling for interpredictor covariance; and (e) social iden-
tity bridges the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective
action.
Method
We used a meta-analytic approach for three, interrelated, rea-
sons. First, a meta-analysis can assess the strength of the relation-
ship between a predictor and a criterion variable across different
measures, methods, and contexts. Thus, a meta-analysis is suited to
answer the question whether there is evidence for the idea that
injustice, efficacy, and identity are good predictors of collective
action despite differences across studies. Second, a meta-analysis
allows an objective examination of the average size of an effect as
well as its variability and consistency. It also allows for the
systematic comparison of the effects of different independent
variables, taking their inter-relationships into account. Third, a
meta-analysis can test for the existence of moderator variables. As
such it allows for the testing of specific theoretical hypotheses.
Operational Definitions and Criteria for Inclusion
We used a set of straightforward but strict criteria for inclusion
of studies in the meta-analysis. Studies had to quantify the asso-
ciation between one or more predictor and collective action. This
excludes qualitative studies of collective action (e.g., Drury &
Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Stott & Drury, 2000). This also
excludes studies that focus only on the antecedents of, for exam-
ple, relative deprivation (e.g., Folger, 1986). Studies also had to
report individual-level subjective (rather than objective; e.g.,
Geschwender & Geschwender, 1973; Gurr, 1968, 1970) measures
of peoples’ sense of injustice, efficacy, and identity. Below we
specify more detailed criteria for inclusion for each variable.
Collective Action
Collective action was the dependent variable in all included
studies. Wright et al.’s (1990) often-cited definition of collective
action is “A group member engages in collective action any time
that he or she is acting as a representative of the group and where
the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as
a whole” (p. 995). The first part of this definition emphasizes that
individual group members can act on behalf of their group as well
as that such actions constitute collective action (see also J. C.
Turner et al., 1987). The second part identifies a broad array of
behaviors as “collective action.” However, in the present meta-
analysis we restricted collective action to expressions of protest
against collective disadvantage because this is the specific focus of
our analysis.
Operationally, therefore, collective action in this article refers to
the attitudinal support for protest as well as the protest intentions
or behaviors of members of a social group that are directed at
removing the perceived underlying causes of the group’s disad-
vantage or problem (e.g., signing a petition, participating in a
demonstration). This implies that, for example, we excluded stud-
ies in which general action tendencies rather than specific action
tendencies were measured (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000) as well as
studies that measured a type of collective behavior that did not fit
the definition (e.g., measures of intergroup bias or differentiation,
Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; or support for affir-
mative action,5 Tougas & Veilleux, 1988).
Injustice
Injustice is generally aroused by perceptions of unfair treatment
or outcomes. In this meta-analysis, feelings of injustice tend to be
based on subjective perceptions of group-based inequity (i.e., some
inequality or disadvantage that is perceived as illegitimate). Stud-
ies of objective inequality were not included in the meta-analysis.
Although many different operationalizations of injustice can be
found, theoretically their relationship with collective action should
be similar. The non-affective measures of injustice in our sample
included perceived unfairness of procedures, perceived undeserv-
ingness of collective disadvantage, and perceived collective mis-
treatment (e.g., group-based discrimination). Measures of the af-
fective experience of injustice included dissatisfaction, fraternal
resentment, and group-based anger. Thus, the operational defini-
tion of injustice was an umbrella concept that includes measures of
perceptions and feelings of procedural and distributive fairness as
well as relative deprivation. Typical examples of measures of
5 Although important in its own right, support for affirmative action is
not a good indicator of collective action because it does not involve the
notion of protest.
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injustice are “I think the way we are treated by [out-group] is
unfair,” and “I feel angry because . . . .”
Efficacy
Conceptually, efficacy refers to a sense of control, influence,
strength, and effectiveness to change a group-related problem.
Operationally, we included measures of political and group effi-
cacy (e.g., Fox & Schofield, 1989; Mummendey et al., 1999). We
excluded measures of cost-benefit calculations such as the social,
reward, and collective motives as proposed by Klandermans
(1984, 1997) because these motives are measured as value-
expectancy products and thus only partially capture the efficacy
variable of interest. Typical examples of measures of efficacy are
“To what extent do you think that this [collective action] will
increase chances of the government changing their plans?” and “I
think that together we can change [the group-related problem].”
Identity
Social identity is traditionally defined as “that part of an indi-
vidual’s self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of
his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together with
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”
(Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). In line with more recent operational concep-
tualizations of social identification (Cameron, 2004; Ellemers,
Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Jackson & Smith,
1999), this meta-analysis focuses on two related components of
identification: the cognitive centrality of group membership (i.e.,
the salience or importance of group membership) and the affective
ties that people feel with their group (i.e., a sense of psychological
attachment, commitment, or connection, also referred to as iden-
tification). Theoretically, those two components refer to separate
but nonetheless closely related aspects of social identification.
Cognitive centrality is most explored within self-categorization
theory (i.e., in its analysis of the consequences of social identity
salience; see J. C. Turner, 1985; J. C. Turner et al., 1987), and
identification has become more central in work on SIT (where the
emphasis tends to be on measures of identification and affective
commitment to the group, see Ellemers, Kourtekaas, & Ou-
werkerk, 1999). In many measures of group identification, these
two facets are combined (and indeed, covariation is usually very
high; see Cameron, 2004). Measures typically include items load-
ing on affective commitment: “I identify with/feel connected to/
feel strong ties with [group X]” and/or items loading on self-
categorization: “I see myself as/define myself as a member of
[group X].” The studies we included used measures of politicized
identity (i.e., identification with a social movement, or as an
activist) as well as measures of non-politicized identity (i.e., iden-
tification with the disadvantaged group).
Literature Search
As a first step, we conducted a literature search with multiple
databases (e.g., the PsychINFO, SOCIndex, and Web of Science
databases, until June 2007) by using combinations of the keywords
collective action, (social) protest, injustice, unfairness, (relative)
deprivation, agency, efficacy, instrumentality, identity, identifica-
tion, and solidarity. In addition, we contacted researchers known to
have conducted published or unpublished studies on the topic of
collective action. We systematically searched programs of major
international conferences to include recent unpublished work and
checked the reference lists of the included articles until no new
articles were found. Furthermore, we sent requests for relevant
studies via the mailing lists of major European (EAESP) and
American (SPSP) professional social psychology organizations.
All articles retrieved were filtered on the basis of the inclusion
criteria detailed above. In total, 182 independent samples met the
criteria for inclusion (65 for injustice, 53 for efficacy, and 64 for
identity). From this, 245 effect sizes were coded. There are more
effect sizes than independent samples because many studies in-
cluded more than one independent variable or dependent variable
of interest (e.g., affective and non-affective measures of injustice
within one sample; measures of politicized or non-politicized
identity within one sample; intentions and behavioral measures of
collective action within one sample). For each of the analyses, the
effect sizes were treated in such a fashion that independence
assumptions were not violated (see details below). In terms of
participant numbers, the total sample size for injustice was N 
15,855; for efficacy N  12,758; and for identity N  10,051.
Average sample size per effect size was n 244, n 241, and n
157, respectively.6
Coding of Moderator Variables
A detailed coding book was developed. Below we provide
details of the exact operationalization of the variables. Two coders
independently read the articles and rated characteristics and mod-
erator variables (some categorical, some at interval level). For the
nine categorical moderator variables, overall intercoder agreement
was 97.53%. Disagreements were solved through discussion. For
the interval moderator variables, intraclass correlations were cal-
culated (see below), and coder ratings were aggregated. The cor-
relations between the moderators are reported in Table 6.
Non-Substantive Moderator Variables
Age
When the mean age of a sample was reported, this was entered
into the database. When age was not reported but population
information was provided, we estimated the mean age (e.g., 20 in
the case of college students). When such information was not
reported, it was recorded as a missing value.
Gender Composition
When the gender composition of a sample was reported, we
coded whether this was a female-only sample, a mixed sample, or
a male-only sample. When this information was not reported, it
was recorded as a missing value.
6 When omitting the large Roefs (2003) study, average Ns per study for
injustice and efficacy were 192 and 177, respectively, with SDs of 203 and
149, respectively. For identity, the average N per study was 157 with an SD
of 95.
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Type of Method
Instructions for coders were to answer the question “Which
method was used in this study?” Coders could differentiate be-
tween laboratory experiments (defined by random assignment to
experimental conditions), survey studies (defined by the absence
of random assignment and by the reality of collective disadvan-
tage), scenario studies (defined by the absence of random assign-
ment and by the “imagined” reality of collective disadvantage),
and field studies (defined by the absence of random assignment
and by the collection of data during a protest event). Categories
were collapsed to differentiate between experimental studies (in-
volving random assignment to conditions) and non-experimental
studies (not involving random assignment to conditions).7
Substantive Moderator Variables
Causality
We coded whether studies allowed causal inferences to be
drawn (i.e., when the predictor was manipulated or when the
predictor predicted collective action over time) or did not allow
such inferences. This variable is somewhat different from the type
of method variable because there are experiments in which we
extracted an effect size from a correlation (because the manipu-
lated variable was not the variable of interest for the effect size).
This variable is thus more specific as to whether causal inferences
can be drawn for each effect size, which makes it possible to
examine the causality issue.
Type of Injustice
Coders answered the question “Is injustice measured in this
study as feelings/emotions, as perceptions/cognitions, or both?”
They thus rated whether injustice was measured with affective
measures, non-affective measures, or a combination of both; this
allowed for an examination of SIMCA’s prediction on the predic-
tive power of group-based emotion as a conceptual bridge between
perceived injustice and collective action.
Type of Identity
Coders answered the question “Does the measure of identifica-
tion [used in this study] refer to a disadvantaged group or a social
movement?” They thus rated whether the social identity was
non-politicized or politicized, allowing for a test of SIMCA’s
prediction about the superior predictive power of politicized iden-
tity compared with that of non-politicized identity.
Type of Disadvantage
Coders were also asked the question “Is this group incidentally
disadvantaged or structurally disadvantaged?” They rated whether
the nature of a group’s disadvantage was more incidental (i.e.,
more issue-, situation-, or event-based) or more structural (i.e.,
more embedded in the social structure). Coders also rated the
extent to which collective disadvantage was structural on a 5-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much; see
also Footnote 3). For the interval moderator variable, the intraclass
correlations were .87 for the injustice sample, .86 for the efficacy
sample, and .90 for the identity sample. These reliabilities can be
considered good (see Orwin, 1983). Therefore, we aggregated the
ratings of the two coders. This allowed an examination of SIM-
CA’s prediction that identity (but not injustice and efficacy) pre-
dicts both types of disadvantage equally well.
We further wanted to differentiate the type of disadvantage from
the type of group (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995). There
are some parallels between Deaux et al.’s (1995) typology of
groups and the structural–incidental distinction, but Deaux’s ty-
pology is more fine-grained. Thus, we asked coders to rate whether
the identity under investigation was a vocation (e.g., students,
farmers, nurses, factory workers), a stigmatized identity (e.g., gay
men, women, the elderly), a political affiliation (e.g., members of
peace or social movements), or a nationality/ethnicity (e.g., immi-
grants, ethnic minorities).8 There is some overlap between these
different types of groups and the nature of the disadvantage cate-
gories above: politicized, stigmatized, and national/ethnic groups
tend to be more structurally disadvantaged because their disadvan-
tage is based in their established group membership rather than on
situations or events that are associated with their group (which is
often the case for vocation groups).9 Nonetheless, SIMCA predicts
that it is the extent to which disadvantage is structural (and not the
descriptive typology of their group per se) that decreases the
predictive power of injustice and efficacy (but not identity).
7 We were interested in whether laboratory experiments, through their
presumably stronger internal validity than other types of methods, would
result in stronger effect sizes than other types of methods. Because the
majority of studies were either laboratory experiments or survey studies,
we decided to include scenario and field studies in the same category as
survey studies (i.e., non-laboratory experiments).
8 Deaux et al. (1995) also proposed a category of groups based on
interpersonal bonds. However, none of the groups studied could be clas-
sified as belonging to this category.
9 Coders were also asked to rate whether groups were self-chosen and
group boundaries were permeable. Incidental disadvantage often occurs on
the basis of group membership that is relatively fixed (e.g., residents in a
neighborhood may discover that a windfarm is planned to be built in their
backyard, or students may be confronted with having to pay higher tuition
fees). Structural disadvantage is also based on fixed group memberships
(e.g., being a woman), but, in contrast, people can choose to join a social
movement (e.g., a feminist movement). Whether an identity is chosen or
not is an important distinction from the perspective of SIT, also because
permeability between group boundaries is virtually zero in the case of fixed
groups (Ellemers, Kourtekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). This distinction adds
a further dimension to the Deaux et al. (1995) categorization—one cannot
perhaps choose one’s ethnicity (hence intergroup boundaries are imperme-
able), but one can choose to become a member of a civil rights group.
Coders rated these variables of choice and permeability on a 5-point
Likert-type scale by answering the questions “To what extent have people
chosen themselves for this group membership?” (identity choice) and “To
what extent are people able to leave their group?” (permeability). The
intraclass correlations were .76 and .68 for the injustice sample, .72 and .70
for the efficacy sample, and .67 and .65 for the identity sample, respec-
tively. These reliabilities can be considered reasonably good. Therefore, we
aggregated the ratings of the two coders. Random effects analysis, how-
ever, did not show support for the moderating role of identity choice: for
injustice,   – .05, p  .69; for efficacy,   –.05, p  .70; and for
identity,   .05, p .68. Moreover, random effects analysis did not show
support for the moderating role of permeability: for injustice,   .11, p 
.40; for efficacy,   .07, p  .61; and for identity,   .01, p  .92.
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Type of Measure of Collective Action
Coders rated whether attitudes, intentions, behaviors, or a mix-
ture of one or more of these measures regarding collective action
was measured. The intentions category consisted of intentions as
well as action tendencies. The behavior category consisted of
actual behavior as well as self-reported past behavior. This allowed
an examination of the predictions that effect sizes should decrease
the more the measure approximates actual behavior, that behav-
ioral measures should produce weaker effects than those of non-
behavioral measures, and that behavioral measures should still be
empirically greater than zero.
Statistical Methods
As a measure of effect size, we decided to use the correlation
coefficient r. The reason for this is that a large proportion of research
in the sample was correlational. When different statistics than r were
reported (e.g., 2, t, or F statistics), they were converted to r with the
formulas provided by Rosenthal (1994). According to Cohen (1988),
effect sizes of .10 are small, .30 are medium, and .50 are large. We
used a random effects model analysis that is recommended when
studies are heterogeneous (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rosenthal, 1994).
This analysis assumes, unlike fixed effects model analysis, that vari-
ance around the mean effect size cannot be completely explained by
potential moderators due to the heterogeneity of the sample of studies.
It is therefore a more conservative test of our hypotheses than is fixed
effects model analysis. Weighted averages of the effect sizes were
computed on the basis of Fisher Z-transformed correlations (Zr) by
using the inverse of the variance as weights (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
When insufficient statistical information was reported to com-
pute r, we used as exact information as possible to estimate the
effect size. When researchers reported, for example, that “F  2”
for a non-significant effect, we based the effect size estimate on
this information. In two cases, no other information than that the
effect was non-significant was reported, and in these two cases, we
conservatively assigned an effect size of zero. Because including
or excluding these two cases in the analyses did not affect the
results, we decided to retain them in the analyses.
Each independent sample was treated as an independent data
point. When multiple effect sizes could be computed for one
sample, we pooled these effect sizes to one average r to avoid
statistical interdependence. However, when multiple effect sizes
were available that corresponded to different levels of moderator
variables that we coded for, we separated these effects out for
those particular analyses that allowed it. It is for this reason that the
total number of effect sizes is larger than the number of effect sizes
for independent samples. It should be noted that this method
ensures that each effect size estimate was based on a different
(sub-)sample, and hence all analyses were conducted on statisti-
cally independent data. The effect sizes can be found in the
Appendixes.
Mean effect sizes as well as tests for moderation were computed
by using David Wilson’s macros for SPSS (http://mason.gmu.edu/
dwilsonb/ma.html). Reliability for mean effect sizes was estab-
lished through calculation of confidence intervals as well as
Stouffer’s Z. Variation in effect sizes was examined with the QW
statistic (i.e., an index of within-group variance or homogeneity).
Effects of potential moderator variables were examined by com-
puting analyses of variance providing estimates of between-group
variance (QB) for the categorical moderator variables or by using
weighted regression analysis providing estimates of the strength of
the relationship between the moderator and the effect size () for
the interval moderator variables. The latter allows for multivariate
regression analyses in which potential confounds (such as non-
substantive variables like age or type of method) can be statisti-
cally controlled for.
Results
Independent Effects of Identity, Injustice, and Efficacy on
Collective Action
As can be seen in Table 1, random effects analysis showed that
mean effect sizes of all three predictors differed significantly from
zero, ranging from .34 to .38.10 According to Cohen’s (1988)
guidelines, these effects are of medium size (for comparison pur-
poses, the equivalent ds range from 0.72 to 0.83). Descriptively,
therefore, injustice, efficacy, and identity all have equally strong
relationships with collective action. However, we have synthesized
these effects independently of each other and hence conclusions
about their unique predictive strengths cannot be drawn without
assuming that the three predictors are uncorrelated.11
The distribution of the effect sizes for all three predictors was,
as expected and as can be seen in Figures 1A–1C, highly hetero-
geneous: For injustice, effects ranged from moderately negative
(r  –.28) to strongly positive (r  .73). It should be noted,
however, that the negative effects were relatively isolated events.
For efficacy, effects ranged from essentially zero (r  –.03) to
strongly positive (r  .80). For identity, effects were in a similar
range (r  –.23 to r  .82, with the negative effect isolated). As
can be seen in Table 1, the significance of the QW statistic for all
three samples confirms that the samples are highly heterogeneous.
The existence of this much heterogeneity is testament to the
diversity of the literature in terms of its methods, measures, par-
10 The file-drawer problem (e.g., Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) does not
appear to be an issue for these results. First, the fail-safe N (Orwin, 1983;
Rosenthal, 1979) for all three predictor samples suggests that many more
independent samples showing null effects are needed before mean effect
sizes are reduced to small effects (r .10; Cohen, 1988): For injustice, 163
additional samples are needed; 128 are needed for efficacy and 180 for
identity. In order to reduce mean effect sizes closer to zero (r .01), 2,210
additional samples are needed for injustice; 1,749 are needed for efficacy
and 2,368 for identity. It is very unlikely that such an extreme under-
representation of unpublished studies finding null effects between the three
predictors and collective action exists. Moreover, as can be seen in Figures
1A–1C, the funnel graphs for each meta-analysis show roughly funnel-
shaped distributions of effect sizes around the mean, which is consistent
with the conclusion that these are reliable estimates.
11 Potential problems concerned disproportionately influential studies
due to large sample size as well as statistical outliers. We therefore capped
one exceptionally large study (Roefs, 2003) and trimmed outliers to sta-
tistically acceptable values in the analyses. There were two outliers in the
injustice sample (Putman & Klandermans, 2003; Van Zomeren & Spears,
2007b), four in the efficacy sample (Blader, 2007, Study 1, Study 2; Van
Zomeren, 2006, Study 3.2; Van Zomeren, Scheepers, & Spears, 2007), and
three in the identity sample (Blader et al., 2007, Study 2; Lindly &
Nario-Redmond, 2004; Putman & Klandermans, 2003).
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ticipant samples, and social contexts, and it is consistent with the
use of a random effects approach for the analyses. Moreover, it
suggests that there is substantial scope for moderator variables to
explain variance.
The Issue of Causality
As noted, the vast majority of the studies in the meta-analyses
conceptualized collective action as the criterion variable, and in-
justice, efficacy, or identity as the predictor variable(s). In doing
so, they assumed a causal relationship. Because we coded whether
causal inferences could be made for each effect size, we could
compare the average effect sizes of studies that allow causal
inferences and studies that do not.
Results showed that there were no significant differences be-
tween effect sizes in studies that allowed causal inferences versus
those that did not. In the injustice sample, there was virtually no
difference between the two: QB(1)  0.01, p  .92 (for causal
research, r  .37, p  .001; and for non-causal research, r  .36,
p  .001). There was no difference in the efficacy sample either,
QB(1)  0.01, p  .93 (for causal research, r  .36, p  .001; for
non-causal research, r  .36, p  .001). In the identity sample,
there was a slight but non-significant tendency for effects to be
somewhat smaller in the research that allowed causal inferences:
QB(1)  2.22, p  .13 (for causal research, r  .30, p  .001; and
for non-causal research, r  .41, p  .001).
Results thus suggest consistent support across the three vari-
ables for the causal sequence that is generally assumed. The effect
size of these causal relations is equivalent to that found in non-
causal research. This suggests that even if reverse causality can, in
some cases, be a significant occurrence, the magnitude of these
reverse effects is not such that they would entirely invalidate
causal inferences drawn from the observations of cross-sectional
data. Across the board, therefore, there is strong support for the
assumption that identity, injustice, and efficacy predict collective
action.
Moderator Variables
In our examination of moderator variables, we first examined
whether non-substantive variables (like the age and sex composi-
tion of participant samples) moderated effect sizes. If such mod-
eration would occur, these variables can pose a threat to interpre-
tations of possible effects of more substantive (i.e., theoretically
informed) moderator variables. However, our reasoning was that if
the predicted effect of a substantive moderator variable holds when
controlling for (potentially confounding) non-substantive moder-
ator variables, then we can be more certain that such moderations
are indeed substantive.
Non-Substantive Moderator Variables
Age. For the injustice sample, mean age was 28.71 years
(SD  10.22). For the efficacy sample, mean age was 30.72 years
(SD  12.16), and for the identity sample, mean age was 33.25
years (SD  13.15). Weighted multivariate regression analysis
showed only one significant effect of age across the three meta-
analyses: Age negatively predicted the effect size between injus-
tice and collective action (  –.42, p .01), but it did not predict
the effect size between efficacy and collective action (  –.22,
p  .15), nor did it predict the effect size between identity and
collective action (  –.12, p  .37). In sum, only for the
injustice–collective action link did age matter: Younger people
appeared to act more strongly on injustice than did older people.
We therefore included age as a statistical control in our examina-
tion of substantive moderators of the injustice–collective action
relationship.
Sex composition. Random effects analyses showed no signif-
icant effects of sex composition across the three meta-analyses.
Sex composition of the samples did not affect the effect size
between injustice and collective action, QB(2) 0.89, p .64; nor
did it affect the effect size between efficacy and collective action,
QB(2)  3.50, p  .17; or the effect size between identity and
collective action, QB(2)  1.61, p  .44. In sum, sex composition
did not moderate effect sizes.
Type of method. Random effects analyses showed significant
effects of method for the injustice sample, QB(1)  12.88, p 
.001; and for the efficacy sample, QB(1)  8.25, p  .01; but an
effect for the identity sample that only approached significance,
QB(1)  3.40, p  .07. The experimental studies in the injustice
sample produced stronger effects (r  .50, p  .001) than did the
non-experimental research (r  .31, p  .001). For efficacy, there
was a similar difference with experimental studies having larger
effects (r  .49, p  .001) than those of non-experimental studies
(r  .31, p  .001). For identity, experimental studies (r  .47,
p .001) produced only somewhat stronger effect sizes than those
of non-experimental studies (r  .36, p  .001). Thus, type of
method moderated effect sizes in two out of the three samples.
However, given the null effects for the causality variable, these
moderating effects are likely to be non-substantive. Therefore we
statistically controlled for type of method in the analysis of sub-
stantive moderators below.
Substantive Moderator Variables
Type of injustice. As can be seen in Table 2, random effects
analysis shows a significant between-class difference, QB(2) 
Table 1
Summary of Effect Sizes for Injustice, Efficacy, Identity, and
Collective Action
Sample r SD 95% CI Z p k QW p
Injustice
All studies .35 .20 .30, .39 13.77 .0000 65 541.19  .0001
Subset .37 .25 .28, .45 7.66 .0000 27 194.00  .0001
Efficacy
All studies .34 .19 .29, .39 13.05 .0000 53 365.78  .0001
Subset .35 .24 .27, .43 7.73 .0000 27 170.51  .0001
Identity
All studies .38 .20 .33, .42 14.93 .0000 64 411.07  .0001
Subset .34 .16 .28, .39 10.53 .0000 27 80.12  .0001
Note. Mean effects and confidence limits listed in this table have been
transformed back to the r metric from the z-transformed estimates obtained
in these analyses. r  correlation coefficient representing the mean effect
size; 95% CI  the 95% confidence limits of r; SD  weighted standard
deviation of the mean effect size; Z  z test for the mean effect sizes; p 
probability of z test; k  number of samples associated with the mean
effect size; QW  within-group heterogeneity; p  probability of QW test.
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21.05, p  .0001. Affective injustice produced significantly stron-
ger effect sizes than those of non-affective injustice, QB(1) 
12.41, p .001; and those of the mixed/unclear category, QB(1)
20.48, p  .0001. Non-affective injustice and the mixed/unclear
category did not differ, QB(1)  1.79, p  .18. When collapsing
the non-affective injustice and mixed/unclear categories, affective
injustice (r  .49) still produced stronger effect sizes than those of
this category (r  .31), QB(1)  19.40, p  .0001.
To control for the possible confounding influences of age and
type of method, we included type of injustice (dummy-coded with
affective injustice as one category and non-affective injustice as
another category), age, and type of method (dummy-coded with
experimental studies as one category and non-experimental studies
as another category), in a weighted multivariate regression analy-
sis. Results showed that the effect of type of injustice held ( 
.40, p  .001), independent of the effect of age that approached
significance (  –.24, p  .06) and the non-significant effect of
type of method (  .11, p  .43). The regression model was
significant, Q(3)  36.85, p  .0001, random effects variance
component v  .03, with an explained variance of 35%.
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Figure 1. A: Funnel graph for meta-analysis on the injustice–collective action relationship. B: Funnel graph
for meta-analysis on the efficacy–collective action relationship. C: Funnel graph for meta-analysis on the
identity–collective action relationship.
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Type of identity. As can be seen in Table 3, random effects
analysis shows a significant between-class effect, QB(1)  4.09,
p  .05. Politicized identity (r  .43) produced stronger effect
sizes than did non-politicized identity (r  .34). Nevertheless, the
fact that non-politicized identity still predicted a substantial
amount of variance in collective action (a medium-sized effect)
suggests that social identity in general predicts collective action
rather well.
Again, we controlled for the possible confounding influence of
type of method. Results of a weighted multivariate regression
analysis showed that the effect of type of identity held (  .36,
p  .01), independent of type of method (  .35, p  .01). The
regression model was significant, Q(2)  12.98, p  .01, random
effects variance component v  .03, with an explained variance of
16%.
Type of disadvantage. As predicted by SIMCA, and as can be
seen in Table 4 (left hand side), random effects analysis shows a
significant between-class effect of type of disadvantage for injus-
tice, QB(1)  6.29, p  .02; for efficacy, QB(1)  5.84, p  .02;
but not for identity, QB(1) 0.02, p .90. That is, effect sizes are
larger for incidental disadvantage than for structural disadvantage
for both injustice and for efficacy, but, importantly, this effect was
not obtained for identity. Results for the interval moderator vari-
able corroborated these results (see the right hand side of Table 4)
for injustice (  –.42, p .001), for efficacy (  –.35, p .01),
and for identity (  –.03, p  .82).
For the injustice sample, when we statistically controlled for the
possible confounding influence of age and type of method, the
effect of type of disadvantage held (  –.27, p  .03), indepen-
dent of age (  .23, p  .14) and type of method (  .23, p 
.15). The regression model was significant, Q(2) 15.98, p .01,
random effects variance component v  .03, with an explained
variance of 29%.
For the efficacy sample, results showed that the effect of type of
disadvantage almost held (  –.23, p .07), independent of type
of method (  .31, p  .02). The regression model was signif-
icant, Q(2)  12.26, p  .01, random effects variance component
v  .03, with an explained variance of 19%.
Type of group. We also tested whether type of group would
moderate effect sizes in a similar fashion as predicted for type of
disadvantage (i.e., moderating effects for the injustice and efficacy
samples only), where type of group approximates the incidental–
structural distinction.
For injustice, random effects analysis indeed showed a signifi-
cant effect of type of group, QB(3)  12.44, p  .01. As can be
seen in Table 5, vocational groups showed stronger effect sizes
(r .46, p .001) between injustice and collective action than did
the other types of group (r  .31, p  .001), QB(1)  8.27, p 
.01. When controlling for age and type of method, this contrast
(between vocation and other groups) only approached significance
(  .23, p  .09). There were no effects of age (  –.21, p 
.18) or type of method (  .20, p  .23). The regression model
was significant, Q(3)  17.56, p  .001, random effects variance
component v  .03, with an explained variance of 27%.
For efficacy and collective action, random effects analysis
shows an effect approaching significance, QB(3)  7.48, p  .06.
Again, vocational groups showed stronger effect sizes (r  .45,
p .001) between efficacy and collective action than did the other
types of group (r  .30, p  .001), QB(1)  7.32, p  .01. When
controlling for type of method, this contrast was no longer signif-
icant (  .18, p  .31). However, there was no effect of type of
method either (  .24, p  .18). The regression model was
significant, Q(3)  9.17, p  .02, random effects variance com-
ponent v  .03, with an explained variance of 15%.
Finally, effect sizes between identity and collective action did
not show the pattern obtained for the injustice and efficacy sam-
ples: Random effects analysis did not show a significant effect,
QB(3)  2.62, p  .45. As can be seen in Table 5, vocational
groups did not show stronger effect sizes (r  .37, p  .001)
between identity and collective action than did the other types of
group (r  .41, p  .001), QB(1)  .41, p  .52.
Results pointed to a general convergence between the moderat-
ing effects of type of disadvantage and type of group. We therefore
tested whether type of disadvantage or type of group would best
predict effect sizes for the injustice and efficacy samples. For
injustice, a weighted multivariate regression analysis showed that
in such a combined analysis, only type of disadvantage predicted
effect size (  –.39, p  .04). There was no effect of type of
group (  .04, p  .82). The regression model was significant,
Table 2
Effect Sizes Between Injustice and Collective Action as a
Function of Type of Injustice
Type of injustice r 95% CI Z p k
Affective .49a .43, .55 13.32 .0000 26
Non-affective .34b .28, .39 10.55 .0000 38
Mix/unclear .26b .18, .35 5.81 .0000 18
Between-class effect QB(2)  21.05, p  .0001
Random variance component v  .03
Note. These analyses were conducted by using Fisher’s z-transformed r
values. Mean effects and confidence intervals listed in this table have been
transformed back to the r metric from the z-transformed estimates obtained
in these analyses. Mean effect sizes that do not share subscripts are
significantly different from each other. r  correlation coefficient repre-
senting the mean effect size; 95% CI the 95% confidence limits of r; Z
z test for the mean effect sizes; p  probability of z test; k  number of
samples associated with the mean effect size.
Table 3
Effect Sizes Between Identity and Collective Action as a
Function of Type of Identity
Type of identity r 95% CI Z p k
Politicized .43a .36, .49 11.31 .0000 27
Non-politicized .34b .28, .40 10.93 .0000 45
Between-class effect QB(1)  4.09, p  .05
Random variance component v  .04
Note. These analyses were conducted by using Fisher’s z-transformed r
values. Mean effects and confidence intervals listed in this table have been
transformed back to the r metric from the z-transformed estimates obtained
in these analyses. Mean effect sizes that do not share subscripts are
significantly different from each other. r  correlation coefficient repre-
senting the mean effect size; 95% CI the 95% confidence limits of r; Z
z test for the mean effect sizes; p  probability of z test; k  number of
samples associated with the mean effect size.
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Q(2)  13.53, p  .01, random effects variance component v 
.03, with an explained variance of 18%.
For efficacy, we ran the same analysis but also included type of
method (as it predicted effect size). Results showed no significant
effects for type of disadvantage (  –.06, p .80), type of group
(  .14, p  .55), and type of method (  –.22, p  .27).
Because multicollinearity may be part of the reason why results are
inconclusive here (see Table 6), we also ran the same analysis
without type of method as a predictor. Nonetheless, results still
showed no effects for type of group and type of disadvantage and,
hence, remained inconclusive for the efficacy sample.
Type of measure of collective action. As can be seen in Table
7, there are significant between-class effects for all three predic-
tors. The distribution of the mean effect sizes is consistent across
predictors: Measures of attitudes toward collective action tended to
produce the strongest effect sizes (ranging from .45 to .70, al-
though the latter estimate was based only on k  2), followed by
action intentions (ranging from .36 to .37), and actual behavior
(ranging from .21 to .30). Importantly, effect sizes of behavioral
measures of collective action are reliably greater than zero in all
samples. Unsurprisingly, a mixture of measures generally results
in medium effect sizes (for injustice, r  .39; for efficacy, r 
.34).
As expected, behavioral measures tended to result in smaller
effect sizes than did non-behavioral measures in all samples:
significantly so for injustice, QB(1)  4.84, p  .03; and efficacy,
QB(1)  4.57, p  .05; and approaching significance for identity,
QB(1)  2.82, p  .10. Thus, the particular contrast between
behavioral and non-behavioral measures resulted in relatively
weak but distinct differences in mean effect sizes.
Again, we tested whether this effect held when controlling for
type of method. For injustice, results showed that the effect of type
of measurement of collective action (dummy-coded) turned into a
statistical trend (  –.19, p  .12), whereas there was a signif-
icant effect of type of method (  .44, p  .001). The regression
model was significant, Q(2)  18.88, p  .0001, random effects
variance component v  .03, with an explained variance of 27%.
For efficacy, results showed that the effect of type of measure-
ment of collective action did not hold (  –.21, p  .15), but
there was also no significant effect of type of method (  .27,
p  .06). The regression model was significant, Q(2)  8.79, p 
.02, random effects variance component v .04, with an explained
variance of 16%.
For identity, results showed that the effect of type of measure-
ment of collective action that approached significance did not hold
(  –.17, p  .21), but there was no effect of type of method
either (  .14, p .28). The regression model was not significant
either, Q(2)  4.00, p  .13, random effects variance component
v  .04, with an explained variance of 6%.
Toward Further Theoretical Integration: SIMCA
We now turn to a more direct test of SIMCA. Our database
contained a relatively large subset of independent samples in
which all three predictors were measured (k  27, with a total N
of 3,084), and correlations between predictors as well as between
predictors and collective action were derived from these. We
excluded those studies that did not include all variables; we did
this for the simple reason that the substantial number of studies
measuring all three variables of interest allowed for a robust and
stable estimate of all covariations of interest, retaining the same N
and k for the entire data matrix, and therefore with similar confi-
dence intervals for each. We used this matrix as input for a path
analysis that allows tests for the viability of SIMCA and alterna-
tive theoretical models. The robustness of the effect size estimates
that can be obtained with meta-analytic data make these suitable
Table 4
Effect Sizes for Injustice, Efficacy, Identity, and Collective Action as a Function of Type of Disadvantage
Type of disadvantage
Categorical moderator
p
Interval moderator
r 95% CI Z k  p
Injustice
Structural .28a .21, .36 7.15 .0000 25 .42  .001
Incidental .41b .35, .47 13.13 .0000 40
Between-class effect QB(1)  6.29, p  .02
Random variance component v  .03
Efficacy
Structural .25a .15, .35 4.81 .0000 13 .35  .01
Incidental .39b .33, .45 13.15 .0000 40
Between-class effect QB(1)  5.84, p  .02
Random variance component v  .03
Identity
Structural .39a .32, .47 10.29 .0000 31 .03  .82
Incidental .40a .32, .47 10.61 .0000 33
Between-class effect QB(1)  .02, p  .90
Random variance component v  .04
Note. These analyses were conducted using Fisher’s z-transformed r values. Mean effects and confidence intervals listed in this table have been
transformed back to the r metric from the z-transformed estimates obtained in these analyses. Mean effect sizes that do not share subscripts are significantly
different from each. r  correlation coefficient representing the mean effect size; 95% CI  the 95% confidence limits of r; Z  z test for the mean effect
sizes; p probability of z test; k number of samples associated with the mean effect size;   standardized regression coefficient representing the relation
between the moderator variable and the effect size; p  probability of .
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for such analyses (e.g., because they are less sensitive to outliers
and other sources of random as well as non-random variation).
We first checked whether this subset produced comparable
effect sizes between collective action and injustice, efficacy, and
identity. As can be seen in Table 1, results were very similar to
those for the full sample, producing medium-sized effects for all
three predictors (ranging from .34 to .37). The synthesized corre-
lation matrix can be found in Table 8.
SIMCA
SIMCA proposes that social identity bridges the injustice and
efficacy explanations of collective action while allowing for a
direct effect of identity on collective action. In other words,
identity predicts collective action directly as well as indirectly,
through its prediction of the injustice and efficacy variables. The
errors of efficacy and injustice, however, were not allowed to
correlate (as no variance should be shared between the two except
for the variance due to identity’s prediction). Using EQS 6.1
(Bentler, 2005), results showed that, descriptively, this model
produced the best fit of the models we tested, 2(1)  18.80, p 
.0001. It is not surprising that the chi-square statistic was signifi-
cant given its sensitivity to sample size. However, more appropri-
ate fit indices suggested that the data closely matched the model’s
predictions: comparative fit index (CFI)  .99, generalized fit
index (GFI)  .99 (both of which should be above the desired
benchmark of .90), squared root mean residual (SRMR)  .03,
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .08 (both of
which should be below the desired benchmark of .10). As can be
seen in Figure 2, identity predicted injustice (.26), efficacy (.19),
and collective action (.21). Moreover, the predictive strengths of
injustice and efficacy were .28 and .28, respectively.
Other Integrative Models
We first tested an alternative model that represents the view that
identity predicts collective action through perceived and felt in-
justice. The idea here is that identity affects perceived and felt
injustice, which in turn propels collective action. Efficacy does not
predict collective action in this model, and we allowed efficacy to
correlate with the other two predictors because the approaches on
which this model is based make no clear predictions regarding
them. Results showed that this model did not fit the data well,
2(2)  535.69, p  .0001. The fit indices similarly suggested fit
was not good: CFI  .60 and GFI  .93, and SRMR  .12 and
RMSEA  .29. In this model, there were positive correlations
between identity and injustice (.26), between identity and efficacy
Table 5
Effect Sizes for Injustice, Efficacy, Identity, and Collective
Action as a Function of Type of Group
Type of group r 95% CI Z p k
Injustice
Vocation .46a .38, .54 11.04 .0000 23
Stigma .39ab .29, .49 7.51 .0000 15
Political
affiliation .30bc .20, .40 5.96 .0000 14
Nationality/ethnicity .25c .15, .35 4.89 .0000 13
Between-class
effect QB(3)  12.44, p  .01
Random variance
component v  .03
Efficacy
Vocation .45a .36, .54 9.94 .0000 20
Stigma .32ab .16, .47 4.05 .0001 6
Political
affiliation .31bc .23, .40 7.23 .0000 20
Nationality/ethnicity .26bc .13, .40 3.81 .0001 7
Between-class
effect QB(3)  7.48, p  .06
Random variance
component v  .03
Identity
Vocation .37a .28, .46 8.13 .0000 22
Stigma .45a .34, .57 7.64 .0000 12
Political
affiliation .42a .33, .52 8.51 .0000 17
Nationality/ethnicity .34a .23, .45 5.88 .0000 13
Between-class
effect QB(3)  2.62, p  .45
Random variance
component v  .03
Note. These analyses were conducted using Fisher’s z-transformed r
values. Mean effects and confidence intervals listed in this table have been
transformed back to the r metric from the z-transformed estimates obtained
in these analyses. Mean effect sizes that do not share subscripts are
significantly different from each. r  correlation coefficient representing
the mean effect size; 95% CI  the 95% confidence limits of r; Z  z test
for the mean effect sizes; p  probability of z test; k  number of samples
associated with the mean effect size.
Table 6
Correlation Matrix for Moderator Variables
Moderator variable 2 3 4 5 6
Injustice-collective action meta-analysis
1. Type of injustice .18 .57** .42** .31** .30**
2. Type of collective action — .24 .32** .22* .46**
3. Type of group — .45** .59** .36**
4. Type of method — .18 .68**
5. Type of disadvantage — .18
6. Age —
Efficacy–collective action meta-analysis
1. Type of collective action .27* .34** .12 .25
2. Type of group — .71** .40** .44**
3. Type of method — .23 .54**
4. Type of disadvantage — .26
5. Age —
Identity–collective action meta-analysis
1. Type of identity .34** .33** .39** .08 .46**
2. Type of collective action — .15 .31** .16 .25*
3. Type of group — .39** .71** .14
4. Type of method — .23* .42**
5. Type of disadvantage — .05
6. Age —
* p  .01. ** p  .001.
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(.19), and between injustice and efficacy (.12). The predictive
strength of injustice was .37.12
The second alternative model we tested represents the view that
identity and efficacy uniquely predict collective action. Injustice does
not predict collective action in this model, and because efficacy and
identity are conceptualized as individual- and group-level predictors
of collective action, they should not be correlated. We allowed the
other two correlations between the three predictors to be estimated
because the approaches on which this model is based make no clear
predictions regarding them. Results showed that this model did not fit
the data well, 2(2)  412.60, p  .0001; CFI  .69, GFI  .94,
SRMR  .11, RMSEA  .26. In this model, there were positive
correlations between identity and injustice (.24), and between injus-
tice and efficacy (.08). The predictive strengths of identity and effi-
cacy were .29 and .31, respectively.13
The third alternative model we tested represents the view that
identity predicts injustice and efficacy, both of which predict
collective action in turn. Thus, the model does not allow for a
direct effect of identity and does not assume that the errors of
injustice and efficacy are correlated. Results showed that this
model also did not have very good fit, 2(2)  187.81, p  .0001.
Fit indices were better than in the previous alternative models, but
they did not all meet the desired benchmarks: CFI  .86, GFI 
.97, SRMR .07, RMSEA .17. In this model, identity predicted
injustice (.26) and efficacy (.19), and the predictive strengths of
injustice and efficacy were .34 and .32, respectively. In sum, the
only integrative model that produced a good fit to the data was
SIMCA.
Discussion
The results of our quantitative research synthesis of the effects
of injustice, identity, and efficacy on collective action supported
multiple SIMCA predictions: (a) injustice, efficacy, and identity
each (causally) affected collective action; (b) affective injustice
produced stronger effect sizes than did non-affective injustice, and
politicized identity produced stronger effect sizes than did non-
politicized identity; (c) identity predicted both incidental and struc-
tural disadvantage, whereas injustice and efficacy tended to predict
structural disadvantage less well than incidental disadvantage; (d)
12 We also tested a less restrictive model that allowed correlations
between the predictors, and predictive effects of identity and injustice (but
not of efficacy). This model did not fit the data either, 2(1) 303.51, p
.0001, CFI  .77, GFI  .95, SRMR  .09, and RMSEA  .31.
13 We also tested a less restrictive model that allowed correlations
between the three predictors, the predictive effects of identity and efficacy,
but not the predictive effect of injustice. This model did not fit the data
either, 2(1)  301.79, p  .0001, CFI  .77, GFI  .96, SRMR  .08,
and RMSEA  .31.
Figure 2. Social identity model of collective action (SIMCA).
Table 7
Effect Sizes for Injustice, Efficacy, Identity, and Collective
Action as a Function of Type of Measure of Collective Action
Type of measure of
collective action r 95% CI Z p k
Injustice
Attitude .45a .32, .56 6.13 .0000 8
Intention .36a .29, .42 10.45 .0000 41
Behavior .21b .08, .34 3.04 .0009 10
Between-class effect QB(2)  6.71, p  .04
Random variance
component v  .04
Efficacy
Attitude .70a .52, .82 5.88 .0000 2
Intentiona .36b .30, .42 10.65 .0000 37
Behaviora .25c .14, .35 4.60 .0000 14
Between-class effect QB(2)  15.93, p  .001
Random variance
component v  .04
Identity
Attitude .49a .39, .58 8.32 .0000 12
Intention .37b .31, .43 11.23 .0000 42
Behavior .30b .20, .40 5.37 .0000 14
Between-class effect QB(2)  6.74, p  .05
Random variance
component v  .04
Note. These analyses were conducted using Fisher’s z-transformed r
values. Mean effects and confidence intervals listed in this table have been
transformed back to the r metric from the z-transformed estimates obtained
in these analyses. Mean effect sizes that do not share subscripts are
significantly different from each. r  correlation coefficient representing
the mean effect size; 95% CI  the 95% confidence limits of r; Z  z test
for the mean effect sizes; p  probability of z test; k  number of samples
associated with the mean effect size.
a Intention and behavior differ at p  .06.
Table 8
Correlation Matrix for Subset
Variable 2 3 4
1. Injustice .26** .12* .37**
2. Identity — .19** .34**
3. Efficacy — .35**
4. Collective action —
* p  .01. ** p  .001.
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all three predictors had unique effects when controlling for inter-
predictor covariance; and (e) social identity bridged the injustice
and efficacy explanations of collective action, with SIMCA re-
ceiving better empirical support than the other integrative models
we tested.
Three Unique Explanations of Collective Action
The results showed strong and consistent support for three
distinct socio-psychological perspectives on collective action. At-
titudes toward collective action, collective action intentions or
tendencies, and actual behavioral measures of collective action
were all predicted by peoples’ subjective senses of injustice, effi-
cacy, and identity. Effect sizes were moderate on the whole,
although they were somewhat smaller for measures of actual
behavior. However, given the nature of these collective actions, the
inaccuracies associated with measurement (i.e., reliance on single
instances of action instead of more sophisticated multiple-behavior
indices), and the sometimes considerable amounts of adversity
associated with them, even such relatively small effects can be
impressive (Prentice & Miller, 1992). Thus, results confirmed the
importance of injustice, efficacy, and identity as explanations of
collective action.
The Issue of Causality
Hitherto, inferences in this literature have been largely based on
correlational data. As is almost always the case with cross-
sectional samples, warnings have been sounded in the past that the
causal inferences that are conventionally drawn in this literature
may be incorrect (Klandermans, 1997). However, the results of the
present meta-analysis show that effect sizes in cross-sectional
studies are very similar to effect sizes in research that allows
causal inferences to be drawn. Thus, results support the often-
made assumption in the collective action literature that injustice,
efficacy, and identity each are causes of collective action. More-
over, it suggests that to the extent that reverse causation effects
exist, these effects are not large or else, by inference, effect sizes
in cross-sectional research should have been stronger.
Moderator Variables
Despite the fact that effect sizes were of medium strength on
average, there was also considerable variation around the mean. As
predicted by SIMCA, some of this variance was explained by
moderator variables. However, we note that moderators in meta-
analysis are often (and almost inevitably) confounded (see Table
6). Although we were in most cases able to statistically control for
non-substantive moderators, our conclusions regarding the mod-
erators should be treated with caution. Future (primary) research
should corroborate our conclusions.
Type of Injustice
Affective injustice predicted collective action better than non-
affective injustice. This is in line with previous meta-analytic
results reported by H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) specific to the
relative deprivation–collective action link as well as with theoret-
ical developments in relative deprivation research, which has
shifted its concern from individual perceptions of inequality to the
experience of feelings of group-based relative deprivation. More
generally, these findings fit nicely with recent work conceptualiz-
ing group-based emotion as predictors of tendencies to engage in
collective action (Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993;
Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In line with SIMCA, these results tie the
experience of affective injustice directly to social identity because
the latter is an important psychological basis for group-based
perception, emotion, and action.
Type of Identity
Politicized identity predicted collective action better than non-
politicized identity. This is in line with work by Simon, Stu¨rmer,
and colleagues (for a review, see Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a), who
argued that a politicized identity is more specific to collective
action, and hence politicized identity goes hand in hand with a
stronger internal obligation to participate in social movement
activities (Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). These results point once
more to the prominence of social identity in collective action, as
outlined by SIMCA. More specifically, they may explain why
there is a unique effect of identity on collective action: Identities
can politicize, and as a consequence people experience a stronger
“inner obligation” to participate (Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). More
generally, these findings focus attention on the importance of
social identity content. Ultimately, it may not necessarily be social
identity or identification per se that prepares people for collective
action, but rather the content of social identity. Social identities
thus form a basis for collective action to the extent that they form
or transform individuals’ identities from those that are defined by
social circumstance into more agentic ones (Drury & Reicher,
1999; Hercus, 1999; Reicher, 1996, 2001; see also Klein et al.,
2007).
Type of Disadvantage
Injustice and efficacy more strongly predicted responses to
incidental disadvantage than to structural disadvantage (although
the effect only approached significance for the efficacy sample and
did not hold when controlling for type of group). Identity, how-
ever, was a strong predictor for collective action against both types
of disadvantage. These findings together support both SIMCA and
the idea that a theoretically consequential distinction can be made
between incidental and structural disadvantage. However, the
strong correlations between type of disadvantage and type of group
suggest that incidental disadvantages are more likely to be asso-
ciated with vocational groups than groups based in stigma, polit-
ical affiliation, and ethnicity/nationality (see Table 6). It is clear
that this strong relationship is relevant to explaining our results.
In response to incidental disadvantages, the greater influences of
injustice (and efficacy) are explained by the idea that structural
disadvantage is more harmful psychologically, but is less likely to
evoke action-oriented emotional responses such as group-based
anger (Major, 1994; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002), and is harder
to change (Jost & Major, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius
et al., 2004). At a more structural level, these results also reflect
the fact that in the case of intergroup differences with a long
history, those differences become part of the established structure
of society to such an extent that disadvantaged groups might even
see their state as natural and self-explanatory (Major, 1994) or, in
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other terms, “essential” and natural properties of the groups in
question (see Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). It is therefore
not surprising that these processes are more relevant to groups
associated with stigma, political affiliation, and ethnicity/
nationality.
Nonetheless, identity predicted collective action against both
structural and incidental disadvantages. According to SIMCA,
social identity is important in relation to structural disadvantages
because collective action requires that an existing social identity is
transformed. SIT was originally developed as a theory of inter-
group relations, specifically aimed at explaining the structural
case. Therefore, peoples’ sense of identification with a group was
predicted to be a function of socio-structural conditions that im-
plied cognitive alternatives to the status quo (Tajfel, 1978). How-
ever, social identity is also important in relation to incidental
disadvantages because it enables group-based appraisal, emotion,
and action. This is because group-based emotions are conceptual-
ized as functional responses to appraised situations, and incidental
disadvantages by definition allow for such responses to novel
situations or events. Thus, social identity matters to incidental
disadvantage too because it is formed on the basis of the situation
or event (e.g., Reicher, 1996).
Type of Measurement of Collective Action
Unsurprisingly, attitudinal measures of collective action pro-
duced the strongest effect sizes, followed by intentions and behav-
ioral measures. Although these effects appeared to be strong and
clear, it should be noted that they did not hold after controlling for
non-substantive variables. Nonetheless, because alternative expla-
nations of this effect were not conclusive either (as non-
substantive variables did not consistently moderate effect sizes),
and because results were in line with classic models of the
attitude–behavior link (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975), we conclude with some caveats that results sup-
ported these models.
Importantly, although behavioral measures resulted in smaller
effects than did non-behavioral measures, they were still reliably
greater than zero in all three samples. This strengthens the case for
the use of behavioral measures (either actual behavior or self-
reported past behavior), which are especially important if research-
ers seek to generalize to actual collective action. Admittedly,
collective action can be hard to measure in terms of behavior,
especially in controlled and often somewhat artificial laboratory
contexts. However, such operationalizations are not impossible.
For example, a recent study nicely operationalized collective ac-
tion as the number of leaflets taken by participants to give to others
(Langner, 2006). This operationalization allows for an interval
level of measurement and captures the social nature of collective
action in terms of the elements of social influence and mobiliza-
tion.
Toward Further Theoretical Integration: SIMCA
Results showed strong support for SIMCA in a more direct test
of the model, and weaker support for alternative integrative models
(e.g., Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Mummendey et al., 1999; Simon
et al., 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). This corroborates the point
that previous theory and research on collective action has not
sufficiently acknowledged that each of these three has unique
predictive value as well as that they also have a clear set of
interrelations among them in which social identity has a key
bridging function.
By acknowledging the power of the specific emotional experi-
ence of group-based injustice, SIMCA moves beyond Simon et
al.’s (1998) model, which acknowledges the prominence of social
identity but not so much the predictive power of its group-specific
emotional consequences. SIMCA also moves beyond Mum-
mendey et al.’s (1999) and Van Zomeren et al.’s (2004) models by
incorporating Simon et al.’s (1998) assertion that identity has a
unique effect on collective action. This may be due to the possi-
bility that identity can politicize, and, hence, people feel a stronger
internal obligation to engage in collective action (Stu¨rmer &
Simon, 2004a). Thus, SIMCA allows for social-identity-based
processes of emotion and politicization.
Moreover, although SIMCA acknowledges the “divide” be-
tween the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective action,
it does not see them as mutually exclusive explanations (as debates
in the seventies and eighties sometimes presented them) but rather
suggests that social identity bridges this “divide.” In this respect,
SIMCA concurs with both Mummendey et al.’s (1999) and Van
Zomeren et al.’s (2004) models that the injustice and efficacy
explanations do not covary above and beyond the shared variance
due to identity’s prediction of them. Indeed, SIMCA holds that
identity predicts injustice (because it provides the basis for group-
based perception, emotion, and action) as well as efficacy. In line
with Mummendey et al.’s (1999) and Reicher, Drury, and col-
leagues’ theorizing (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005), identity predicts
efficacy because social identity empowers relatively powerless
individuals. Although there may be important differences between
efficacy (perhaps more calculative and “cold”) and empowerment
(perhaps more affective, and associated with positive group-based
emotions) there is, in our view, a common basis where both should
be associated with a mounting sense that social influence can be
exerted through collective action.
Implications for Theory, Practice, and Future Research
There are at least four key questions about the potential impli-
cations of SIMCA’s suggestion that social identity predicts col-
lective action directly and indirectly. First, what are the implica-
tions for future theorizing on collective action? Second, what are
the more practical implications of our analysis? Third, what are the
key issues for future research to consider? Fourth, what are the
broader implications for scholars in other disciplines in the social
sciences?
Implications for Theory
Although SIMCA suggests that social identity is at the very
heart of explaining collective action, little is known yet about how
the content and strength of social identities develop over time. In
particular, we need to know more about (a) how perceptions of
group-based injustice translate into powerful group-based emo-
tions that predict collective action and (b) the processes through
which social identities become politicized. Of course, the two are
related. The first issue relates to how people come to participate in
collective action in the first place. Here group-based emotions like
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anger may be of major relevance because they motivate people to
act on perceived injustices (i.e., they raise their action readiness;
Frijda, 1986). In fact, the relative importance of the affective and
group-based experience of injustice fits with Simon and Klander-
mans’s (2001) suggestion that “shared grievances” and “adver-
sarial attributions” are important variables in the mobilization
process. Indeed, appraisal theories of emotion (for an overview,
see Scherer et al., 2001) suggest that appraisals of injustice and
other-blame are distinct elements of anger (see also Lazarus,
1991). When such appraisals are group-based, one can speak of a
shared sense of injustice or grievances, and when a particular
out-group is blamed for the group-based injustice, group-based
emotions like anger should be highly predictive of collective
action.
The second issue relates to the process by which social identities
are transformed such that they become more geared toward action.
For example, both Reicher (1996) and Stu¨rmer and Simon (2004a)
have suggested that collective action participation itself may en-
courage the development of a politicized identity (see also Hercus,
1999). According to Simon and Klandermans (2001), another
important element in this process is individuals’ awareness that
society at large is involved in the struggle (i.e., that collective
action is inherently political because it is fought out in the public
arena). Collective action may therefore be viewed as going beyond
the simple in-group/out-group distinction, involving third parties
whose support may be crucial to victory in the power struggle.
In our view, a two-level process seems likely: a first level in
which social identity, group-based emotions such as anger, and
group efficacy beliefs jointly determine whether people engage in
collective action and hence become collective action participants;
and a second level in which actual participation in collective action
(and the interaction with other activists that it implies) politicizes
social identity such that, by definition, people become aware of the
involvement of society at large. This two-level analysis is also
applicable to the conceptual distinction between incidental and
structural disadvantage. Collective action against incidental disad-
vantages seems particularly likely to take place at the first level,
where situations or events form social identities that in turn enable
group-level appraisal, emotion, and action. Given that there is no
pre-existing social structure and no established social identity, this
first level may already move people into action through the
strength of social identification, group-based emotion, and group
efficacy beliefs. Collective action against structural disadvantage,
however, may depend more on processes at the second level: the
transformation of an established social identity into a more polit-
icized one. Here the strength of (politicized) identification should
be the key predictor, with less reliance on, and therefore a less
predictive role for, group-based emotions and group efficacy
(which may be cued more by the social context than when em-
bedded in a politicized identity).
This two-level analysis derived from SIMCA specifies and
complements Klandermans’s (1997) analysis of how people be-
come social movement participants. Klandermans argued that, in a
first and second step, individuals have to sympathize with a social
movement and be targeted by the movement before they become
potential social movement members. SIMCA offers a more elab-
orate theoretical explanation of the psychological processes in-
volved in these steps by pointing to the role of social identity
formation and group-based emotions in bridging individual per-
ceptions of injustice and collective action. Moreover, it suggests
that social identity is involved in empowerment processes that
facilitate collective action. In a third and fourth step, Klandermans
(1997) argued that people are motivated by the social movement
for specific actions and need to overcome practical obstacles to
participation. Here, too, SIMCA offers a complementary theoret-
ical explanation of the psychology involved in these steps by
pointing to the role of social identity transformation and politici-
zation rendering more focused, agentic, and committed activist
identities that should be a better predictor of collective action than
injustice and efficacy. Longitudinal research examining this two-
level process of how people become collective action participants
(with a key role for social identity, group-based emotions, and
group efficacy), and how their identity transforms (with a key role
for the politicization of social identity), would therefore seem
timely and valuable.
Practical Implications
SIMCA offers some powerful and straightforward implications
for practice through its conclusion that social identity is at the very
heart of explanations of collective action. A stronger sense of
social identity should relate to a stronger motivation to engage in
collective action (through stronger adherence to group norms), a
stronger perception and experience of injustice (through group-
based emotional experience), and a stronger sense of efficacy
(through empowerment). Although those who aim to mobilize
group members for action can use all three elements of a collective
action frame (Gamson, 1992), SIMCA suggests more specifically
which psychological processes need to be influenced. Moreover,
SMOs can help transform the content of social identity into a more
politicized identity, which should raise one’s motivation for col-
lective action even more (through a stronger inner obligation to
act). SMOs should therefore try to both strengthen and transform
individuals’ social identities.
However, note that our analysis (necessarily) examined the three
explanations of collective action as additive effects. It is of course
possible that there are interactions between the three predictors of
collective action. For example, it could be the case that high and
low identifiers perceive and experience the social world qualita-
tively differently and are hence differentially motivated to engage
in collective action (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam, 2000; see also Kelly
& Breinlinger, 1996). If true, then this may suggest that low
identifiers could be “persuaded” to engage in collective action in
different ways than might high identifiers. For example, low
identifiers’ commitment to the group is more sensitive to instru-
mental impediments and potential, whereas, in contrast, high iden-
tifiers stick with their group irrespective of contextual constraints
(Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,
1999). Thus, low identifiers may be more effectively motivated for
collective action through instrumental factors such as efficacy,
whereas high identifiers may be motivated more strongly by fac-
tors such as the experience of (affective) injustice (e.g., Kelly &
Breinlinger, 1995).
One important question in this respect is whether such moder-
ating effects are more likely to be found for people with non-
politicized identities than for those with politicized identities (who
are also likely to be high identifiers with the more general social
category). As suggested in the two-level model derived from
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SIMCA, those with politicized identities may have different mo-
tivations to engage in collective action than do those with non-
politicized identities. Therefore, exploring the interactions be-
tween (politicized and non-politicized) identity, injustice, and
efficacy as explanations for collective action should be of consid-
erable interest to collective action theorists, researchers, and prac-
titioners.
Implications for Future Research
Our analysis raises numerous issues for future research. We
focus here on what we consider to be the key themes: Research
should examine the reverse causal effects between the variables
that SIMCA incorporates (e.g., between identity and injustice, and
between identity and efficacy), and research should examine how
the two social-identity-based predictors of collective action—
politicized identity and group-based emotions—can be combined
to constitute a particularly powerful predictor of collective action.
In addition, we believe that the relationship and interplay between
systemic conditions and SIMCA’s subjective predictors of collec-
tive action deserves further study. Perhaps most importantly, this
meta-analysis highlights the need for more behavioral research.
Reverse causation. Although SIMCA predicts that social iden-
tity bridges the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective
action, it is quite likely that evidence can also be obtained for the
reverse relationships, for example with collective feelings of in-
justice increasing levels of identification (e.g., Branscombe et al.,
1999; Postmes & Branscombe, 2002; see also Kessler & Holbach,
2005). Indeed, appeals to a collective sense of injustice and wrong-
doing may operate as rallying calls for a group, fostering solidarity
against a common enemy. In a similar vein, it is possible that
identity and efficacy share a reciprocal relationship (i.e., stronger
efficacy resulting in stronger identification, and stronger identifi-
cation resulting in a greater perception of efficacy). Future (exper-
imental) research should aim to disentangle these two possibilities
to further our understanding of the dynamic processes between
identity and injustice, and between identity and efficacy.
One can also wonder how participation in collective action itself
affects identity, injustice, and efficacy. Whereas collective action
may be important in the process of politicization of a social
identity (Reicher, 1996; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a), it may also
affect injustice and efficacy. It may affect injustice because par-
ticipation may increase the emotional experience of group-based
injustice through social sharing and/or increased (expectations of)
social support (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Moreover, partic-
ipation may affect group efficacy beliefs because of the empow-
erment people feel while they (or those they affiliate with) chal-
lenge the established order (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005). Indeed,
it is on the basis of past victories (perhaps symbolic, perhaps only
by a vanguard) that group members can begin to transform their
social identities. It is useful in this light to refer to terrorism, which
can be seen to fulfill this function of demonstrating the establish-
ment’s vulnerabilities with an eye to the politicization of identity.
Thus, the examination of the dynamic processes between collec-
tive action, on the one hand, and identity, injustice, and efficacy,
on the other hand, is yet another direction for future research to
consider.
“Politicized” emotions. Our results further raise the question
of which group-based emotions on the basis of politicized identi-
ties will be even more predictive of collective action. Future
research should consider whether politicized identities incorporate
the experience of strong positive group-based emotions such as
pride that motivate individuals to engage in collective action. Such
feelings of pride may also be associated with experiences of moral
superiority, with perceptions of those who oppose one’s cause
(e.g., the government) as “immoral,” and with the group-based
emotional experience of moral outrage against those responsible
for the “immoral” state of affairs (e.g., Tetlock, 2002; Van Zome-
ren & Spears, 2008). Future research is necessary to examine these
novel and interesting suggestions.
Interplay between systemic conditions and SIMCA. A broader
and more general implication of SIMCA is that subjective vari-
ables appear crucial in explaining collective action. Of course, this
perspective does not deny the relevance of systemic influences and
socio-structural factors, and in particular it does not diminish the
relevance of intergroup dynamics in social conflict (e.g., Klander-
mans, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). What it does suggest,
however, is that these influences of intergroup dynamics and social
structure, including history and ideology, are likely to be psycho-
logically mediated. This ultimately means that in social move-
ments and bodies of collective action (crowds, communities, etc.)
there is agency. Individuals, whether they are ordinary participants
or leaders, make choices and decisions that can have far-reaching
consequences for the course of events and that cannot be solely
explained by the social and economic conditions within which
those actions arise. In other words, the psychological dimension of
collective action is both relevant and consequential, especially
where the proximal determination of collective action is con-
cerned. At the same time, it should be clear that the psychology of
collective action cannot be understood in a social vacuum—for a
theory of collective action to be viable, it will need to be multi-
disciplinary, and any account of psychological processes needs to
take account of the historical, social, and political factors that form
the social context they also originate from.
Therefore, the next step for theoretical integration seems to be
the examination of the potential interaction between objective and
subjective variables. For example, one could conceptualize in-
dexes like socioeconomic status, social capital, political opportu-
nity structure, or social movement network size as potential facil-
itators or impediments to collective action to the extent that they
are subjectively perceived as raising or lowering the group’s
efficacy to achieve the group’s goal(s). One could also conceptu-
alize factors indicating values of justice and freedom in society
(i.e., right to freedom of speech, due process) as affecting collec-
tive action to the extent that, through a system of justice, justice is
more likely to be subjectively perceived and, hence, collective
action is less likely to occur. In our view, the examination of the
interaction between subjective and objective variables should be a
key step forward in terms of further (multidisciplinary) theoretical
integration. Broad, dynamic, flexible models of collective action
(Klandermans, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001) may therefore
consider SIMCA as a specific basis on which to develop specific
predictions concerning the role of such objective variables.
Another important implication of SIMCA relates to the rational
individual actor assumption (M. Olson, 1968), or intuitive econo-
mist metaphor (Tetlock, 2002), which is often used in the broader
social and political sciences to explain individuals’ behavior and
decision making. Although we did not include individuals’ cost-
525PREDICTING COLLECTIVE ACTION
benefit calculation motives in the research synthesis, theoretically
such motives are arguably not based in social identity but rather in
personal identity concerns. Hence, these motives should—if any-
thing—predict collective action independent of the SIMCA vari-
ables (Simon et al., 1998; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). This implies
that although “rational actors” may participate in collective action
when the individual benefits outweigh individual costs, the social-
identity-based processes identified by SIMCA (group-based emo-
tions, empowerment, adherence to group norms) should predict
collective action above and beyond these individual cost-benefit
calculations, and they might even exert a powerful influence on the
valuation of these costs and outcomes that form the input for such
calculations. Our perspective thus goes beyond the rational actor
assumption by pointing to the importance of social identities that
can be formed and transformed as well as function as psycholog-
ical platforms on which group-based perception, emotion, and
action ensue (see also Van Zomeren & Spears, 2008).
Behavioral measures. This quantitative research identifies
some of the shortcomings and weaknesses of current psychological
research on collective action. At present, most quantitative re-
search relies on self-reports as measures of injustice, efficacy,
identity, and collective action. This raises numerous concerns. A
general concern is that self-reports assume that collective actions
are undertaken on the basis of mental processes (motivations,
affiliations, etc.) of which people are consciously aware. It is
doubtful whether this is entirely the case. Psychological explana-
tions for collective action that are based on the frustration–
aggression hypothesis (Berkowitz, 1989; Dollard, Doobs, Miller,
Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), or explanations based on deindividuation
theory (Diener, 1980; but see Postmes & Spears, 1998), both
assume that collective action is based on unconscious or uncon-
trolled processes (displacement and decreased self-awareness, re-
spectively). It would therefore be useful for future research to rely
more on different classes of process variables as well as on more
behavioral outcome measures. However, the reliance on self-report
measures does not invalidate the conclusions of our analysis. This
is because our main conclusions are corroborated by research
using behavioral measures and/or experimental methods—
confirming that reported effects are both likely to be causal and
consequential. Both conscious and non-conscious processes may
thus play a role in motivating people to engage in collective action,
but at present we know more about the conscious factors involved.
In conclusion, this article proposed and examined SIMCA as an
integrative psychological perspective, with injustice, efficacy, and
most prominently social identity as its key components for under-
standing and predicting collective action. According to this per-
spective, social identity helps relatively powerless individuals to
perceive and emotionally experience incidental and structural dis-
advantages as unjust as well as to feel empowered in order to
challenge those in power. This paints a positive picture of humans
relying on social cooperation in groups to meet the challenges they
face—even when their established membership in these groups
may be the source of the individual hardships they face.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Table of Included Studies, Effect Sizes, Sample Sizes, and Key Moderators for the Meta-Analysis on Injustice–Collective Action
Source r N Type injustice I/S I–S Type group Type CA Type method Causality
Blader (2007) .62 167 1 1 3.00 2 1 2 0
Blader (2007) .73 121 1 1 3.00 2 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .20 63 1 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .14 96 1 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .22 296 1 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .45 104 1 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Corning & Myers (2002) .32 224 1 1 4.50 3 1 2 0
De Weerd (1999) .17 168 1 1 3.50 2 1 2 0
De Weerd (1999) .06 168 1 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .35 714 1 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .50 501 1 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .51 494 1 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .27 714 1 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .28 501 1 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .41 494 1 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Foster et al. (1994) .31 82 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 1
Foster et al. (1994) .31 82 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 1
Gill & Matheson (2006) .25 108 2 2 5.00 3 1 1 1
Gill & Matheson (2006) .51 108 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 1
Grant & Brown (1995) .31 98 2 1 1.00 3 1 1 1
Grant & Brown (1995) .61 98 2 1 1.00 3 1 1 1
Grant & Brown (1995) .41 98 2 1 1.00 3 1 1 1
Hafer & Olson (1993) .45 70 1 2 5.00 3 2 2 0
Kawakami & Dion (1993) .02 113 1 1 1.50 2 1 2 0
Kawakami & Dion (1993) .10 113 1 1 1.50 2 1 2 0
Kelly & Kelly (1994) .13 330 1 1 4.50 4 2 2 0
Koomen & Fra¨nkel (1992) .31 81 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Martin et al. (1984) .15 90 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 1
Olson et al. (1995) .32 50 1 2 4.50 3 2 2 0
Olson et al. (1995) .56 62 1 2 4.50 3 2 1 0
Opp (1986) .23 390 2 1 3.00 4 3 2 0
Opp (1988) .58 121 1 1 4.00 4 3 2 0
Opp (1988) .39 121 1 1 4.00 4 3 2 0
Opp (2000) .17 720 1 1 4.00 5 1 2 0
Pennekamp et al. (2006) .44 132 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Postmes et al. (2007) .45 85 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 0
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Table A1 (continued)
Source r N Type injustice I/S I–S Type group Type CA Type method Causality
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .04 126 1 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .03 126 1 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .25 80 1 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .31 80 1 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Roefs (2003) .07 3,536 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Roefs (2003) .08 3,536 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Sabucedo & Fernandez (2006) .58 261 2 1 4.50 4 1 2 0
Sabucedo & Fernandez (2006) .28 413 2 1 3.00 4 1 2 0
Sani (2007) .11 261 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Schmitt (2006) .07 1,276 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Smith et al. (2006) .29 296 1 1 4.00 2 1 2 0
Smith et al. (2006) .37 299 2 1 4.00 2 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer (2000) .33 68 1 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer & Simon (2004b) .16 199 1 2 5.00 4 2 2 1
Stu¨rmer et al. (2003) .02 132 1 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Tropp & Brown (2004) .11 126 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Tropp & Brown (2004) .36 161 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Tropp et al. (2006) .41 161 1 2 5.00 3 6 2 0
Tropp & Wright (2001) .45 162 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Useem (1980) .40 468 1 2 4.00 5 2 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .28 231 2 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .18 231 1 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .42 202 2 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .41 202 1 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .52 43 2 1 1.50 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .21 43 1 1 1.50 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .38 41 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .04 41 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .62 68 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .54 68 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .58 91 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .09 91 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren (2006) .49 101 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .39 101 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .61 90 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren (2006) .37 90 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .60 45 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .65 45 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .42 62 2 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .46 62 1 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .56 114 2 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .35 114 1 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .60 144 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .54 206 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .57 158 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .72 54 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .38 54 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .42 81 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .44 98 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .29 98 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2007) .54 79 2 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2007) .41 79 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Walker & Mann (1987) .28 64 1 1 4.50 2 3 2 0
Wenzel (2000) .34 179 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Wenzel (2000) .39 179 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Worchel et al. (1974) .35 148 1 1 3.00 4 1 2 0
Worchel et al. (1974) .39 148 1 1 3.00 4 1 2 0
Wright (1997) .45 73 2 2 5.00 3 1 1 1
Wright (1997) .30 41 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 1
Wright & Tropp (2001) .40 301 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Wright & Tropp (2001) .48 301 2 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Note. Source  study from which the effect is derived; r  effect size; N  sample size; type injustice  non-affective ( 1) or affective ( 2) identity;
I/S  dichotomous measure of incidental ( 1) or structural ( 2) disadvantage; I–S  continuous measure of incidental ( 1) to structural ( 5)
disadvantage; type group  vocation groups ( 2), stigmatized groups ( 3), political groups ( 4), and nationality or ethnicity groups ( 5); type CA 
non-behavioral measure of collective action ( 1), a behavioral measure ( 2), or a mix ( 3); type method  experimental ( 1) or non-experimental
research ( 2); causality  causal inferences cannot be made ( 0), or can be made ( 1).
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Appendix B
Table B1
Table of Included Studies, Effect Sizes, Sample Sizes, and Key Moderators for the Meta-Analysis on Efficacy–Collective Action
Source r N I/S I–S Type group Type CA Type method Causality
Axelrod & Newton (1991) .36 288 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Blader (2007) .80 167 1 3.00 2 1 2 0
Blader (2007) .70 121 1 3.00 2 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .28 62 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .22 95 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .43 296 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .43 104 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Corning & Myers (2002) .46 224 1 4.50 3 1 2 0
De Weerd (1999) .36 168 1 3.50 2 1 2 0
De Weerd (1999) .00 168 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .36 714 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .54 501 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .48 494 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .13 714 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .21 501 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Finkel et al. (1989) .35 494 1 4.00 5 3 2 0
Fox et al. (2000) .00 131 1 3.00 4 1 2 0
Fox & Schofield (1989) .12 102 1 3.00 4 1 2 0
Fox & Schofield (1989) .20 102 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Hornsey et al. (2006) .32 231 1 3.50 4 1 2 0
Horvath (1996) .31 172 1 3.50 4 2 2 0
Kelly & Breinlinger (1995) .55 383 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Kelly & Breinlinger (1995) .47 383 2 5.00 3 2 2 0
Kelly & Kelly (1994) .35 330 1 4.50 4 2 2 0
Klandermans (1986) .28 74 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Klandermans (1986) .46 74 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Klandermans (1986) .19 108 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Klandermans (1986) .29 108 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Langner (2006) .05 124 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Liss et al. (2004) .28 215 2 5.00 3 2 2 0
Martin et al. (1984) .15 90 2 5.00 3 1 2 1
Martin et al. (1984) .25 90 2 5.00 3 1 2 1
McKenzie-Mohr et al. (1992) .53 175 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Opp (2000) .42 720 1 4.00 5 1 2 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .03 126 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .15 80 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Roefs (2003) .15 3,536 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Roefs (2003) .10 3,536 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Simon et al. (1998) .47 94 2 4.00 4 1 2 0
Simon et al. (1998) .50 117 2 5.00 4 1 1 0
Stu¨rmer (2000) .17 68 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer & Simon (2004a) .18 199 2 5.00 4 2 2 1
Stu¨rmer et al. (2003) .20 134 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Tropp et al. (2006) .22 161 2 5.00 3 3 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .06 234 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .01 207 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .45 43 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .17 41 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .36 68 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .30 91 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .54 101 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren (2006) .43 90 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .73 45 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .24 62 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .27 114 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .46 144 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .42 206 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .46 158 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .39 54 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .30 81 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .45 103 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (2007) .70 79 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Wolf et al. (1986) .38 233 1 3.00 4 1 2 0
Wolf et al. (1986) .44 233 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Note. Source  study from which the effect is derived; r  effect size; N  sample size; I/S  dichotomous measure of incidental ( 1) or structural ( 2)
disadvantage; I–S  continuous measure of incidental ( 1) to structural ( 5) disadvantage; type group  vocation groups ( 2), stigmatized groups ( 3),
political groups ( 4), and nationality or ethnicity groups ( 5); type CA  non-behavioral measure of collective action ( 1), a behavioral measure ( 2), or
a mix ( 3); type method  experimental ( 1) or non-experimental research ( 2); causality  causal inferences cannot be made ( 0), or can be made ( 1).
(Appendixes continue)
533PREDICTING COLLECTIVE ACTION
Appendix C
Table C1
Table of Included Studies, Effect Sizes, Sample Sizes, and Key Moderators for the Meta-Analysis on Identity–Collective Action
Source r N
Type
ID I/S I–S
Type
group
Type
CA
Type
method Causality
Blader (2007) .21 121 1 1 3.00 2 1 2 0
Blader (2007) .82 121 2 1 2.00 2 1 2 0
Boen (2000) .11 274 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 1
Boen (2000) .22 138 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Boen (2000) .10 73 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 1
Brunsting & Postmes (2002) .27 62 2 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002 .09 96 2 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002 .34 295 2 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Brunsting & Postmes (2002 .62 103 2 1 4.00 4 1 2 0
Cameron & Nickerson (2006) .54 135 2 1 3.50 4 1 2 0
Cameron & Nickerson (2006) .10 135 2 1 3.50 4 1 2 0
Cronin & Smith (2006) .10 161 1 1 4.00 2 1 2 0
Cronin & Smith (2006) .50 161 2 1 4.00 2 1 2 0
Deaux et al. (2006) .52 113 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Deaux et al. (2006) .48 90 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Deaux et al. (2006) .51 114 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Deaux et al. (2006) .62 93 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
De Weerd & Klandermans (1999) .20 168 1 1 3.50 2 1 2 0
De Weerd & Klandermans (1999) .17 168 1 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Duncan & Stewart (2007) .35 248 2 2 5.00 4 2 2 0
Duncan & Stewart (2007) .48 105 2 2 5.00 4 2 2 0
Duncan & Stewart (2007) .15 857 2 2 5.00 4 2 2 0
Goslinga (2004) .36 196 2 1 4.50 4 1 2 0
Goslinga (2004) .28 196 2 1 4.50 4 1 2 0
Goslinga (2004) .14 196 2 1 4.50 4 1 2 0
Hornsey et al. (2006) .63 231 2 1 3.50 4 1 2 0
Kawakami & Dion (1993) .46 113 1 1 1.50 2 1 2 1
Kawakami & Dion (1993) .00 113 1 1 1.50 2 1 2 1
Kelly & Breinlinger (1995) .69 383 2 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Kelly & Breinlinger (1995) .58 383 2 2 5.00 3 2 2 0
Kelly & Kelly (1994) .71 330 2 1 4.50 4 2 2 0
Klandermans (1989) .31 127 2 1 4.00 4 2 2 0
Klandermans et al. (2002) .26 415 1 1 4.00 2 1 2 1
Klandermans et al. (2002) .11 415 1 1 4.00 2 2 2 1
Klandermans et al. (2002) .27 415 2 1 4.00 2 1 2 1
Klandermans et al. (2002) .28 415 2 1 4.00 2 2 2 1
Langner (2006) .32 58 2 2 5.00 3 2 2 0
Langner (2006) .26 124 2 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Lindly & Nario-Redmond (2004) .82 82 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 0
Liss et al. (2004) .28 215 2 2 5.00 3 2 2 0
Pennekamp et al. (2006) .38 136 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Postmes et al. (2007) .35 85 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 0
Postmes et al. (2007) .46 228 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 0
Postmes (2001) .50 205 1 2 5.00 3 1 1 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .23 126 1 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Putman & Klandermans (2003) .00 80 1 2 5.00 5 2 2 0
Sani (2006) .48 262 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Simon et al. (1998) .57 93 2 2 4.00 4 1 2 0
Simon et al. (1998) .31 93 1 2 4.00 4 1 2 0
Simon et al. (1998) .64 117 2 2 5.00 4 1 1 1
Simon et al. (1998) .40 117 1 2 5.00 4 1 1 1
Simon et al. (2007) .34 191 2 2 5.00 4 2 2 1
Smith et al. (2006) .21 329 2 1 4.00 2 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer (2000) .39 68 2 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer (2000) .22 68 1 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer & Simon (2004a) .28 199 2 2 5.00 4 2 2 1
Stu¨rmer & Simon (2004a) .17 199 1 2 5.00 4 2 2 1
Stu¨rmer et al. (2003) .40 136 2 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Stu¨rmer et al. (2003) .27 136 1 2 5.00 4 1 2 0
Tropp & Brown (2004) .31 126 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Tropp & Brown (2004) .28 161 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Tropp et al. (2006) .64 161 2 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Tropp & Wright (2001) .32 162 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Useem (1980) .36 468 2 2 4.00 5 2 2 0
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Table C1 (continued)
Source r N
Type
ID I/S I–S
Type
group
Type
CA
Type
method Causality
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .25 229 2 1 3.50 2 2 2 0
Van Stekelenburg (2006) .28 184 2 1 3.00 4 2 2 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .39 43 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .27 41 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .30 68 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) .29 91 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .66 101 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .37 90 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .28 45 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 1
Van Zomeren et al. (in press) .39 62 1 1 1.00 2 1 2 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .41 144 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .48 206 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007a) .50 158 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .23 54 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren & Spears (2007b) .14 81 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren (2006) .61 97 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Van Zomeren et al. (2007) .30 79 1 1 1.00 2 1 1 0
Veenstra & Haslam (2000) .50 313 2 1 4.00 4 1 1 1
Wenzel (2000) .30 179 1 2 5.00 5 1 2 0
Wright & Tropp (2001) .32 301 1 2 5.00 3 1 2 0
Note. Source  study from which the effect is derived; r  effect size; N  sample size; type ID  unpoliticized ( 1) or politicized ( 2) identity;
I/S  dichotomous measure of incidental ( 1) or structural ( 2) disadvantage; I–S  continuous measure of incidental ( 1) to structural ( 5)
disadvantage; type group  vocation groups ( 2), stigmatized groups ( 3), political groups ( 4), and nationality or ethnicity groups ( 5); type CA 
non-behavioral measure of collective action ( 1), or a behavioral measure ( 2); type method  experimental ( 1) or non-experimental research (
2); causality  causal inferences cannot be made ( 0), or can be made ( 1).
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